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ARE TRADEOFFS BETWEEN JUSTICE AND WELFARE
POSSIBLE? CALABRESI AND DWORKIN ON THE NORMATIVE
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
HANOCH SHEINMAN*

ABSTRACT

Guido Calabresiclaims, first, that the principalgoals of accident law arejustice and cost reduction, and second, that respecting
the demands of justice is a constraint on the pursuit of cost reduction. "Cost reduction" should be read as "welfare enhancement,"
and 'justice" as "rights" or "equality." I interpret the first claim to
imply that justice and welfare are independently valuable goals the
law may appropriatelypursue (BothJustice and Welfare). Thatjustice and welfare are independently valuable goals means that they
may well conflict, in which case a tradeoff between them, and so a
sacrifice in one of them, is inevitable. The main purpose of this Article is to provide a partialdefense of this plausibleassumption. Calabresi's second claim should be taken to assert that the satisfaction of
the goal of welfare cannotjustify a failure to satisfy the goal ofjustice
(Justice Before Welfare). On this reading,justice and welfare may
conflict, but only those tradeoffs thatfavorjustice are, all things considered, permissible. As I read it, Ronald Dworkin's influential critique of Calabresiand normative law and economics generally seeks
to reject Both Justice and Welfare. Officially, Dworkin's critical target is the value of wealth, but I argue that the ultimate purpose of
that critique strongly suggests that it targets the value of welfare.
The critique claims that welfare depends for its value on justice in a
way that renders tradeoffs between the two not just inappropriateor
impermissible, but strictly impossible. Optingfor the just option can
never involve a tradeoff between justice and welfare or a genuine
sacrifice in welfare value. I argue that Dworkin's argumentsfail to
refute the claim that welfare has a value independent ofjustice, and
so may conflict with it. In fact, considerations of the kind to which
Dworkin appeals tend to confirm that welfare neither derives its
valuefrom justice nor depends on justicefor its value. I conclude by
arguingthat tradeoffs between justice and welfare in favor of welfare
* Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Rice University. This Article has
benefited substantially from the probing comments of John Cooper, Gideon Parchomovsky, and Gopal Sreenivasan. I am very grateful to them, as well as to the University of
Maryland School of Law for the opportunity to present it. Special thanks to Jonathan May,
Zara Friedman, and Ben Haley for their valuable editorial work. The Article is dedicated
with great appreciation to my teacher and friend, Guido Calabresi.
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are not only possible, but may also be morally permissible. Paradoxically, the rejection of Calabresi'sJustice Before Welfare provides the
best case for his Both Justice and Welfare-and against Dworkin's
critique.

251

252

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

64:250

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................

II.

III.

IV.

V.

A . The Issue ............................................
B. Justice as a Constraint................................
C. Agenda ..............................................

253
254
256
256

INTERPRETATION ...........................................

257

A.
B.
C.
D.

A. The Critique of Wealth ................................
B. From Wealth to Welfare ...............................

257
260
265
266
268
269
271

THE EXAMPLE-BASED ARGUMENT ..........................

274

A. The Basic Problem ....................................
B. Another Problem......................................

275
275
276
277
278
279
279
281
282
283
285
286

Justice ...............................................
Welfare..
. ...................................
Both Justice and Welfare ..............................
The Permissibility and Possibility of Tradeoffs ...........

DwoRIN's CHALLENGE .....................................

Is WELFARE A VALUE? .....................................

A. First Modification and the Pareto Objection .............
B. Second Modification ..................................
VI.

TRADEOFFS BETWEEN JUSTICE AND WELFARE ..............

A. Starting Afresh .......................................
B. Third Modification ...................................
VII. THE ANALOGY-BASED ARGUMENT ..........................
A. Recipe and Compromise ...............................
B. The Cake Analogy ....................................
C. Calabresi'sResponse ..................................
VIII. JUSTICE AS A CONDITION ...................................
A. The New OrganizingExample .........................
B. The Standard Assumption .............................
C. The Unwilling Taxpayer ..............................
D. The Willing Taxpayer.................................
E. The Weak Condition Thesis ...........................
IX.

JUSTICE BEFORE WELFARE? .................................

A.
B.
C.
D.
X.

Interpretation .................................
Derek and Amartya, One Last Time ....................
Calabresi'sFungibility Theme ..........................
Beyond Rights ........................................

CONCLUSION ...............................................

288

289
291
291
293
294
295
295
297
297
299
300

2005]

TRADEOFFS BETWEEN JUSTICE AND WELFARE

I.

253

INTRODUCTION

"What," asks Guido Calabresi in The Costs of Accidents,' "are the
2
principal goals of any system of accident law?" "First," he immediately answers, "it must be just or fair; second, it must reduce the costs
of accidents."3 We should read this statement in light of the fact that
Costs is meant to be an application of a rather general approach to
evaluating, criticizing, and reforming the law, namely law and economics. The great influence of Costs is surely owed to the fact that it
has justifiably come to be regarded as a classic-perhaps the classicapplication of this more general, and by now vastly popular, approach. This has at least three important implications.
The first is that Calabresi's statement is not meant as an interpretive statement about the goals our current system of accident law actually serves, but rather as a fully normative statement about what goals
it should serve: that our system fails to serve them is a reason to revise
4
not the statement, but our law of accidents. This reflects the fact that
law and economics is first and foremost an approach to evaluating our
legal practices from an external perspective. Notice, second, that Calabresi's declaration of goals does not seem to depend on any feature
of accident (or tort) law in particular. If justice and cost reduction
should be the principal goals of any system of accident law, it is only
fair to ask: Why should they not also be the principal goals of the law
generally? Finally, notice that it is not obvious why the statement
should be confined to the law at all. Assuming that the law should

pursue justice and cost reduction, perhaps this is so simply because
these are the goals society as a whole should pursue, through the law
or otherwise.

Indeed, when Ronald Dworkin takes Calabresi to task a decade
after the publication of Costs over the goals of accident law,' the issue
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
1. GUIDO CALABRESI,
(1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
2. Id. at 24.

3. Id.
4. It is therefore not altogether clear that the familiar complaint that law and eco-

nomics is incapable of explaining the bipolarity of accident law-the fact that tort adjudication connects particular injurers to their particular victims-applies to the strictly
normative strand of law and economics that Calabresi exemplifies. Arguably, Calabresi is
right to stress that there is no obvious reason to limit our search of accident law to a

bipolar system. Id. at 22, 297-98, 302-05. But compare the sensitive criticism of Calabresian
functionalism in Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY AND
THE LAw OF TORTS 131 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).
5. Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980) [hereinafter Is
Wealth a Value?]; Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFsTRA L. REv. 563 (1980) [hereinafter Why Efficiency?]. Both of these articles are reprinted in RONALD DwoRKIN, A MATTER OF
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is understood to be completely normative and general. "Normative,"
in that the question is not what goals our practices pursue but what
goals they should pursue. "General," in that the reference to the law
on the whole, let alone accident law, recedes to the background.
Rather than simply challenging Calabresi's declaration of goals for accident law, Dworkin challenges the more basic assumption that both
justice and cost reduction are independently worthy goals that the law
in general may appropriately pursue. What is more, Dworkin seeks to
deny this assumption by denying the more basic one, namely that
both justice and cost reduction may be independently worthy goals or
values, period.
It is precisely because this claim abstracts from the law altogether
that it can challenge the economic approach to law at the most
profound level. If the normative foundations of the economic approach can be shown to rest on a general mistake about values, then
showing that this approach misunderstands the law is an optional extra. The profound nature of Dworkin's critique may help explain its
great influence.
A.

The Issue

As we shall see in the next Part, Calabresi's talk of cost reduction
is best understood as elliptical-not for the accumulation of wealth
but for the enhancement of welfare. His general claim is that justice
and welfare should be the principal goals of accident law.6 Now it is
natural to balk at the implication that justice and welfare should be
the only principal goals of accident law, or of any other branch of the
law for that matter. This, however, is clearly not what is at issue between Calabresi and Dworkin, and I shall have nothing to say about it
here. At issue is only Calabresi's assumption that both justice and welfare are independently valuable goals that the law may appropriately
pursue. Call this Both Justice and Welfare. But as I have already noted,
the issue is in fact more general than that. For Dworkin challenges
this claim by challenging its first part: the claim that both justice and
welfare are independently valuable goals. Indeed, his attack on Both
Justice and Welfare depends not on any special feature of the law in
PRINCIPLE (1985) [hereinafter A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE]. Further citations to these articles
will refer to the pagination of A Matter of Principle (with the exception of note 78 below).
6. There need not be a genuine difference between the goal of welfare (or welfare
enhancement) and the goal of welfare maximization, provided only that "maximization" is
not taken to exclude other goals. Under this inclusive reading, we could say that the maximization of both welfare and justice are appropriate goals of the law. Given the exclusive
connotations of "maximization," I prefer to simply talk about the goal of welfare or welfare
enhancement.

2005]

TRADEOFFS BETWEEN JUSTICE AND WELFARE

particular, but rather on the very nature of the goals in question. It is
a value-theoretic critique.
Now, as I hope will become clear, Dworkin's critique of Calabresi
and normative law and economics is ambiguous in more than one
respect. But as I hope will also become clear, there are some good
reasons to read the critique as a challenge to the independence of
welfare from justice. The assumption that both justice and welfare are
independently valuable goals, appropriate for the law or for any other
institution to pursue, presupposes that both are independently valuable goals. If two goals are independently valuable, then what satisfies
one goal could well fail to satisfy the other. Put another way, the respective demands of justice and welfare may come apart without losing their intrinsic normative force. This does not suggest that justice
and welfare are independent in the very strong sense that their respective demands are guaranteed to diverge. It only suggests that they are
not guaranteed to converge: the option that satisfies the goal ofjustice
to the highest degree (or the justice-maximizing option) and the option that satisfies the goal of welfare to the highest degree (or the
welfare-maximizing option) may well be different options.
Perhaps the clearest way of making this point is by pointing to a
familiar imagery that Both Justice and Welfare entitles us to invoke.
Given this view, it makes perfect sense to assert that justice and welfare
may come into conflict. And, of course, talk of conflicts between independently valuable goals legitimately breeds talk of regrettable yet
necessary compromises, or tradeoffs. Since each goal retains at least
some of its intrinsically normative force, any resolution of such a conflict would involve a loss or sacrifice of something of intrinsic value,
namely justice or welfare.
There are two ways to challenge the assumption that justice and
welfare are independently valuable goals that may conflict and require
a tradeoff. The first is to deny that the value ofjustice is independent
of welfare. According to utilitarianism, welfare is the only distinct, intrinsically valuable goal. It follows immediately that it is the only independently valuable goal. The utilitarian typically thinks that what we
might regard as distinct considerations of justice are either reducible
7
to considerations of welfare or else lack normative force. Dworkin
takes the only other way of denying the said assumption: he denies
that the value of welfare is independent of justice. To bring this critique, which obviously presupposes the value independence of justice
from welfare, into focus, I shall assume for the sake of argument that
7. See, e.g., Louis

KAPLOW

&

STEVEN SHAVELL,

FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE

(2002).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64:250

utilitarianism is false. The key question boils down to this: Is the value
of welfare independentfrom justice in the sense that entitles us to the tradeoff
imagery?
B. Justice as a Constraint
Calabresi's Both Justice and Welfare implies not only that welfare
is a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal, but also that it is valuable independently from justice: it may retain its intrinsic value in the face of
countervailing justice considerations. But Calabresi also holds another thesis about justice and welfare ("cost reduction"), namely that
the first is a constrainton the pursuit of the second: we are only permitted to pursue the goal of welfare insofar as the goal of justice is already satisfied. Again, the pursuit of welfare cannotjustify a failure to
pursue justice.8 Call this Justice Before Welfare. Now there seems to me
to be a certain tension between this and Calabresi's Both Justice and
Welfare. After all, if welfare enjoys value independence from, and
may conflict with, justice, why believe that it is never permissible to
trade justice for welfare? It is important to notice, however, that the
notion ofjustice as a constraint-even an absolute constraint-on the
pursuit of welfare is consistent with the assumption that welfare's value
is independent from justice. The value independence of welfare from
justice implies that the pursuit of welfare at the expense ofjustice may
well involve a value tradeoff and sacrifice. It does not imply that such
tradeoffs are morally permissible, always or sometimes.
C. Agenda
However general and perfunctory, Calabresi's declaration of
goals for accident law helps explain the sense of pluralism that makes
his version of law and economics attractive. Its underlying assumption
of Both Justice and Welfare is quite plausible. I shall try to provide it
with a partial defense by repelling Dworkin's challenge to the value
independence of welfare-or at any rate, by repelling the challenge
that Dworkin needs for his foundational critique of Calabresi or normative law and economics. I shall defend the view that welfare is valuable independent of justice in the sense that allows for value conflicts
and tradeoffs between the two, the view that we can make perfect
8. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 25-26. Echoing a familiar distinction,
Calabresi remarks that justice is not exactly a goal but rather a constraint. Id at 25. I will
keep using the word "goal" to include all ethically relevant factors, including constraints.
Thus, it can be the goal of the law to be just.
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sense of the claim that trading welfare for the sake of justice may well
involve a genuine loss or sacrifice.
Dworkin's critique of welfare equivocates between two claims.
The first, which he never quite makes explicit, is that welfare, like
wealth, is not a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal at all. The second
claim concedes that welfare is indeed such a distinct goal, but asserts
that the pursuit of justice is a condition on the pursuit of welfare. On
this view, the intrinsic normative force of welfare is confined to cases
in which it does not conflict with justice. This second, more complicated claim better reflects Dworkin's considered view, which is also at
the center of his discussion of welfare and justice a decade after his
original critique of law and economics. 9
I shall argue that neither version of Dworkin's critique of welfare
is convincing. Furthermore, I shall argue that the same considerations that confirm the possibility of tradeoffs between justice and welfare also confirm the common view that such tradeoffs are at least
sometimes morally permissible. Even if we accept the view ofjustice as
a constraint, the view that it is an absolute constraint is untenable.
But of course, the fact that tradeoffs between justice and welfare are at
least sometimes all-things-considered permissible or justifiable entails
their possibility. The untenability of Calabresi's Justice Before Welfare provides a final reason to reject Dworkin's value-theoretic critique
of Both Justice and Welfare.
II.

INTERPRETATION

A. Justice
What is Calabresi's first goal, justice? There are two interpretive
difficulties with this question. First, apart from Both Justice and Welfare and Justice Before Welfare, Calabresi has surprisingly little to say
about justice.' Second, his commitment to Justice Before Welfare,
9. RONALD DWORKIN,JUSTICE AND THE GOOD LIFE (1991) [hereinafterJuslCE AND THE
GOOD LIFE].
10. Calabresi dedicates a section and the two final chapters to justice. THE Cosrs OF
ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 24-26, chs. 15-16. He notes: "if the elusiveness ofjustice cannot
justify ignoring the concept, it at least justifies delaying discussion of it." Id. at 26. Indeed,
he is skeptical about the fruitfulness of justice discourse in a way he is not about that of
welfare discourse: "Justice, though often talked about, is by far the harder of the two goals
to analyze." Id. at 24. Statements about the justice of an alternative accident law "are rarely
backed up by any clear definition of what such support means, let alone by any empirical
research into what is considered fair." Id. These plausible observations seem equally applicable to welfare, however. Just as no argument about what is just can be won by offering a
definition ofjustice, no argument about what enhances welfare can be won by a definition
of welfare (or costs). And arguments about welfare (or costs) can no more be resolved by
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which as we shall see is quite false, gives him a powerful reason to
interpret his justice goal out of existence, on pain of endowing certain
moral considerations with an absolute priority they do not in fact
have. As a result, he tends to assimilate what would otherwise be plausibly regarded as considerations of justice into welfare
considerations. 1 '
My purpose in rendering 'justice" is limited to making the most
sense of Calabresi's Both Justice and Welfare and Dworkin's valuetheoretic critique of normative law and economics. There seems to
me to be two different senses of 'justice" that are pertinent to the
debate. For the most part, I shall interpret the goal ofjustice simply as
the goal of respect for individual rights. It is crucial to establish that
the rights in question are intrinsically normative or valuable moral
considerations that are genuinely distinct from considerations of welfare. But I do not think it crucial to specify any particular working
theory of rights. t2
Both Calabresi and Dworkin seem to think ofjustice in terms of
individual rights. Calabresi's few explicit examples of justice feature
paradigmatic rights, such as so-called inalienable human rights. For
example, an accident law system that reduced accident costs "by 10
percent by beheading all people who knowingly run red lights" would
empirical research alone than can arguments about justice. For placing Calabresi's aversion to justice talk within the larger context of the so-called age of analysis, see James R.
Hackney, Jr., Law and NeoclassicalEconomics: Science, Politics, and the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 LAW & HIST. REv. 275, 311-16 (1997) [hereinafter Reconfiguration].
11. Calabresi describes the goal of justice as "a catchall." THE COSTS OF AccIDETS,
supra note 1, at 28 n.6. And yet, under his interpretation it almost seems to catch nothing.
It is welfare-not justice-that is the catchall goal in Calabresi's account. Indeed, critics
have expressed uncertainty over how seriously we should take Calabresi's claim that justice
is a normative goal of accident law in its own right. See, e.g., Izhak Englard, The System
Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUn. 27, 34-35
(1980); James R. Hackney, Jr., "Law and NeoclassicalEconomics": A Response to Commentaries,
16 LAw & HisT. REv. 163, 166 (1998). Most tort law scholars simply ignore the justice part
of his statement of goals altogether, and focus exclusively on cost reduction (welfare). See,
e.g., ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAw 209 (4th ed. 1995) (the most important
contribution of Costs is "the systematic presentation of general deterrence theory as a
means of optimizing accident costs").
12. The reason I feel it is safe to leave this notion unspecified is that virtually every
plausible further specification would only make it easier for me to reject Dworkin's critique. In particular, rights are commonly conceived of as deontological constraints,
namely considerations that render at least some welfare-maximizing choices impermissible.
In fact, this is how rights figure in Dworkin's own theory of rights. The trouble is that if at
least some tradeoffs of rights for welfare are impermissible, then at least some such tradeoffs are possible, after all. Dworkin's critique requires that tradeoffs between justice and
welfare be neither permissible nor impermissible (see Parts II.D and III below); the common notion of rights as deontological constraints entails that some such tradeoffs are
impermissible.
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still be unjust. 3 Presumably, the thought is that the system would be
unjust because it violates people's inalienable right to life. Given Justice Before Welfare, Calabresi also thinks that such a system would be,
all things considered, impermissible. But we do not have to accept
Justice Before Welfare in order to reject the decapitating reform. We
could plausibly maintain that rights defeat welfare considerations only
within a certain range of cases, and that the present case falls well
within this range. This would allow us to extend our repertoire of
rights beyond the most fundamental ones, without automatically committing ourselves to the counterintuitive view that welfare is always
doomed to be defeated by rights.
Interpreting the goal of justice as the goal of respect for rights is
also the most natural way of reading Dworkin's critique of Calabresi
and normative law and economics. As we shall see in Part IV, the
organizing example of his critique features a violation of a paradigmatic right, namely a private property right.
The other conception of justice that seems pertinent to the debate is distinctly distributive. Both Calabresi and Dworkin are preoccupied with problems of distribution. Calabresi treats the central
problem of Costs as one of distribution, namely how to allocate the
4
The various accicosts associated with accidents or their avoidance.
dent regimes he considers, including his favored regime of strict enterprise liability, 15 are supposed to be alternative solutions to this
problem. It is true that the official position of Costs systematically
treats considerations bearing on the distribution of accident costs as
16
First, however, there
just more aggregative welfare considerations.
7
are difficulties with this approach.' Second, and in any event, Calabresi himself seems to have abandoned it. Soon after Costs, he begins
13. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 293.
14. Id. at 20-21.
15. To be accurate, Calabresi argues that strict enterprise liability is among the systems
that are preferable to the fault system. See id. at 312; see also Guido Calabresi & Jon T.
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
16. In particular, it treats "economic and social dislocations," which other economists
regard as problems of distributive justice, as ("secondary") welfare costs. See THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 24 n.1, 27 n.4, 28 n.6; Guido Calabresi & Kenneth C. Bass III,
Right Approach, Wrong Implications:A Critique of McKean on Products Liability, 38 U. CHI. L.
REv. 74, 75-76 (1970); cf Hackney, Reconfiguration, supra note 10, at 313-14 (Calabresi's
treatment of economic dislocation as a (secondary) cost is forced, because "it constitutes
an argument based on the normative goal of redistributing wealth").
17. In particular, it conflicts with the plausible notion that there may be a morally
significant choice between alternative distributions of accident costs that do not affect welfare
or affect it equally. It is plausible to assume that some of the considerations that bear on the
correctness of a distribution are essentially backward-lookingand so nonwelfarist. For example, it is plausible to think that allocating goods or ills to those who personally deserve
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to treat distribution as a goal distinct from, and independent of, welfare enhancement.18
Dworkin, too, likes to conceive of justice in terms of distribution
or equality, as well as in terms of individual rights. 9 As we shall see,
the organizing example of his more recent discussion of the relation
between justice and welfare features redistributive taxation that aims
at equality in the distribution of resources.
B.

Welfare

I have been assuming that the controversy between Dworkin and
Calabresi concerns the goal of welfare and its relation to justice. But
what is the basis for this assumption? The second goal Calabresi
thinks every system of accident law should have is "cost reduction,"
not "welfare." And the titles of the two articles that contain Dworkin's
critique target "wealth" and "efficiency." Surely, one might naturally
complain that the notion most pertinent to the debate is wealth or
economic efficiency, and not welfare? 2 °
But appearances are misleading in this case. Dworkin's critique
of Calabresi has the larger purpose of refuting the "political theory
about law often called the economic analysis of law,"2 1 of showing that
it "lacks any defensible philosophical foundation."2 2 Calabresi is
widely regarded as a moderate representative of this general approach. If it could be shown that even Calabresi's version rests on a
false value theory, then presumably normative law and economics as a
them may be the right thing to do even if it does not maximize welfare. See generally
GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987).
18. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1098-99, 1102-05 (1972) [hereinafter
The Cathedral]. He regards "as distributional all those effects of liability rules which do not
relate to minimizing (a) the sum of accident costs and avoidance costs, and (b) the administrative costs entailed by that minimization." Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 15, at 1078.
In more recent work, Calabresi repeatedly describes distribution as a goal distinct from
welfare. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability Systems: Can
Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them, 69 IOWA L. REv. 833, 836 (1984)
(since the parties who win or lose are different under alternative accident systems, "the
choice among these approaches is significant not only because of its effects on accident
costs but also because of its distributional consequences"); see also Gregory C. Keating, The
Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1285, 1287,
1308-17 (2001) (openly grounding Calabresian strict enterprise liability in a principle of
distributive justice).
19. See, e.g., DWORKIN, Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 5, at 249; DwOKIuN, Why Efficiency,
supra note 5, at 269-73.

20. See also Ronald Dworkin, A Reply by Ronald Dworkin, in RONALD DWORKIN & CONTEM247, 295 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1983) [hereinafter A Reply].

PORARYJURISPRUDENCE

21.

DWORKIN,

22.

DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE,

Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 5, at 237.

supra note 5, at 4.
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whole could be said to rest on a mistake. Since the importance of the
debate depends on its capacity to illuminate the normative foundations of law and economics, Calabresi's position should be interpreted
so as to make the best sense of this approach.
But given Dworkin's proper assumption that Calabresi means
"cost reduction" as a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal, to interpret it
as wealth maximization is to shortchange normative law and economics. Such an interpretation would render the value theory behind Calabresi's version of law and economics anything but moderate. To be
sure, some brave souls seem to have entertained the idea that wealth is
an intrinsically valuable goal, regardless of its contribution to welfare. 2" But this seems quite wrong. On the face of it, wealth as such is
just a resource whose entire value lies in its capacity to generate welfare: its value is purely instrumental.
I should think that the overwhelming majority of legal economists view wealth not as something that may be worth having for its
own sake (in Dworkin's nomenclature, a "component of value"), but
rather as something that may be worth having for the sake of something else that is indeed valuable in itself, and which is variously called
"utility," "happiness," or "well-being." Or "welfare," as I shall call it.
Whatever else they may be guilty of, the proponents of normative
green paper. "24
law and economics are no "fetishist[s] of little
Now to my ear, "wealth" and "money" (or "buying power") are
largely interchangeable terms (a wealthy person is a person who has a
great deal of money or buying power). And it is hard to see how one
can plausibly conceive of money or buying power as anything other
than a mere resource. But when Dworkin writes about wealth, he
seems to have a rather nonstandard conception of wealth in mind. In
this conception, which is taken directly from Richard Posner, wealth is
(or
maximized when resources are in the hands of those who are
25 Put
them.
for
money
most
would be) willing and able to pay the
differently, one's wealth consists of having what one is willing and able
to pay for. It seems to me that this conception of wealth is better
described as a theory of welfare-more specifically, as a particular preference theory of welfare. According to this theory, welfare consists in
STUD.
23. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
and
Dworkin
on
Comment
A
Wealth:
of
Value
The
Posner,
103, 119 (1979). But cf Richard A.
Kronman, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 244 (1980) [hereinafter The Value of Wealth] (disclaiming
that its
the view that wealth maximization is valuable for its own sake in favor of the view
value is instrumental). But cf infra note 27.
24. Cf DWORIUN, Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 5, at 246.
25. See id. at 237; see also Posner, The Value of Wealth, supra note 23, at 243.
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the satisfaction of all and only the preferences that are backed by ability and willingness to pay money. (To say that my preference for
something is satisfied is simply to say that I actually get it.)
But I do not think we need to agree on the right theory of welfare
to agree that this one will not do. It is simply not true that one's
welfare consists of having what one is willing and able to pay for. Obviously enough, one's inability to pay for some good that one wants,
such as an expensive medicine or better health care (that is better
than the health care one is currently enjoying), hardly shows that the
wanted good is not good for one, that one's life would not go better if
one had the good. (And the mere fact that someone else is willing
and able to pay more for the same good hardly shows that the good
would contribute more to the welfare of this other person than to that
of the first. Accordingly, the handing of goods to those who are willing and able to pay the most for them does not necessarily increase
overall welfare.) In addition, even if one is in fact able to pay, one's
willingness to do so may be uninformed, mistaken, irrational, or otherwise misguided. The fact that one is both willing and able to pay for
spiting one's face, for example, hardly tends to show that doing so
would be good for one. One's willingness to pay for a good may well
express one's wish to have it. But whether making the wish come true
will actually make one's life go better also depends on whether one
has good reasons to have the wish in the first place. 26
Whether or not you agree with me that wealth in the said nonstandard sense is best described as a theory of welfare is beside the
point. What is important is that wealth in this sense cannot plausibly
be said to have intrinsic normative significance or value. Indeed, the
reasons to reject this conception of wealth as a theory of welfare are
also reasons to think that it is not an intrinsically valuable factor in its
own right, apart from welfare. They are reasons to think that wealth
cannot have intrinsic normative significance unless it constitutes welfare. It seems to me that once it is admitted that increasing one's
wealth (or total social wealth) need not increase (and may even decrease) one's welfare (or total social welfare), it must also be admitted
that increasing wealth need not increase anything that is intrinsically
valuable. Imagine a case in which a good is given to one who does not
need it in the slightest but who is willing and able to pay most for it,
rather than to one who desperately needs it. Presumably, no one
would be tempted to claim that the increase in overall wealth in this
26. See generally JAMES
IMPORTANCE (1986).
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case represents an increase in overall welfare. In fact, it represents a
decrease in overall welfare (relative to the other available distributive
option). But then it is hard to believe that the increase in wealth represents an increase in anything of intrinsic normative significance.
27
possibly come from?
Where could the additional intrinsic value
On any plausible interpretations of "wealth" and "welfare," maximizing wealth does not necessarily maximize welfare. In fact, it is
plausible to regard the allowance of a significant discrepancy between
welfare and wealth as a condition of adequacy on theories of welfare.
This still leaves a large room for controversy over the nature of a welfare worth having. The important point is simply the eminently plausible assumption that such a significant discrepancy is possible.
Moreover, the possibility of such discrepancy means that wealth-on
any plausible interpretation of this concept-is not an intrinsically
normative goal. The accumulation or maximization of wealth as such
can only have conditional value.
Still, wealth may contribute to welfare, and it may do so in two different ways, depending on the particular conception of wealth at
work. On the standard conception (wealth as money), wealth is simply a means to the acquisition of welfare. As such, it is clear enough,
its value can only be instrumental. On the nonstandard conception
(wealth as the satisfaction of preferences backed by willingness and
ability to pay), wealth may contribute to welfare in a somewhat different way, which we may or may not wish to refer to as instrumental.
Supposing that some preference theory of welfare is correct, welfare
consists of the satisfaction of certain preferences. But under the nonstandard conception, wealth, too, consists of the satisfaction of certain
preferences: those that are backed by willingness and ability to pay.
to holding
27. I should note that Posner, who at some point comes very close indeed
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Now a preference that is backed by a willingness and ability to pay may
well be a preference the satisfaction of which is constitutive of welfare.
In such a case, satisfying the preference would enhance both wealth
and welfare. Since enhancing wealth in such a case automatically
(without more) increases welfare, it might be misleading to say that
wealth is merely a means to welfare. Perhaps it is more accurate to say
that wealth constitutes welfare-as long as we remember that the constitutive contribution of wealth to welfare is a contingent feature of
the particular case.2 8 Either way, the result is that welfare can be enhanced by enhancing wealth. And this suggests that, at least within
certain ranges of cases, we might be justified in treating wealth as a
proxy of welfare.
Or so it is often assumed in the law and economics literature.
Now, given any adequate account of welfare,just how good a proxy of
welfare wealth can be is an empirical question. Apparently the prospects of a general informative answer to this question are dim. We
should probably expect the answer to vary considerably from one
range of cases to another.
The important point for our purposes is the plausible one that
wealth enhancement is valuable derivatively rather than as a final goal.
It can only be regarded as a worthy goal (of the law or any other institution) to the extent that it reliably enhances welfare.2 9
I believe that this is the best way of characterizing Calabresi's approach to wealth or economic efficiency. If I am right, Calabresi's talk
about "costs," "benefits," and "prices" is first and foremost about welfare costs, benefits, and prices, and only secondarily about wealth or
economic efficiency.3" The latter are logically derivative of, or secon28. This way of speaking is not quite accurate, because the contingent nature
of the
contribution also tends to suggest that it is not one of constitution. Wealth,
it might be
plausibly said, can coexist or overlap with, but can never quite constitute, welfare.
On this
way of looking at things, wealth's contribution to welfare is always instrumental.
But as far
as I can see, nothing in my argument turns on the resolution of this largely
terminological
difficulty.
29. Cf Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis,
109 YALE L.J.
165 (1999) (convincingly arguing that cost-benefit analysis is best conceived
of as a decision procedure that approximates what the pertinent moral standard recommends
better
than other methods, and that the moral standard that justifies cost-benefit
analysis is overall well-being).
30. Calabresi divides costs into three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary.
THE
CosTs OF AccIDENrs, supra note 1, at 26-28. In principle, these three categories
together
may be taken to cover every imaginable setback to individual welfare. He sometimes
uses
"costs" to refer directly to utility or welfare costs: "The word
'costs' is here used in a broad
way to include all the disutilities resulting from an accident and its avoidance.
As such it is
not limited to monetary costs, or even to those which could in some sense
be 'monetizable' . .. ." Calabresi & Melamed, The Cathedra supra note 18, at 1094 n.
11.
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The second assumption that underlies Both Justice and Welfare is
designed to rule out this harmonious picture. It says that justice and
welfare are independently valuable in precisely the sense that ensures
their potential rivalry. We can define value independence counterfactually by saying that two goals are independently valuable of each
other just in case what satisfies one of them might be the same even if
what satisfies the other were different. This is just a convenient way of
capturing the value-pluralistic conviction that the respective demands
of justice and welfare may come apart. The idea is not to deny the
interplay between the two goals. Indeed, the thought that what welfare favors depends in part on what justice favors, like the thought
that what justice favors depends in part on what welfare favors, is very
congenial. The idea, rather, is that such a blissful interplay is by no
means guaranteed by the very nature of these two goals.
In case of a conflict between justice and welfare, we are forced to
adjudicate between the incompatible demands of two genuine distinct
values. Whatever the all-things-considered correct choice may be in
such a case, it would amount to a tradeoff and involve a sacrifice. The
correctness of the all-things-considered choice goes to show that the
loss in question is justified. All the same, it is a genuine loss, because
whichever option we choose is actually worse in some genuine respect
than at least one of the options we forego. This is the idea that "our
goals and methods conflict with one another at times and preclude
the complete achievement of any particular one."3 2
D.

The Permissibility and Possibility of Tradeoffs

There is one more basic interpretive question we need to attend
to before we can proceed. The debate between Dworkin and Calabresi is about whether we should "allow for," or "tolerate," or think it
"makes sense" to talk about, tradeoffs between justice
and welfare.
But this is all rather ambiguous. In fact, the debate is marred by a
failure to distinguish clearly between the permissibility of tradeoffs
and their very possibility (or occasional actuality). On Dworkin's side,
this failure results in creating the false impression that Calabresi believes such tradeoffs are permissible. More confusing still, when
Dworkin finally corrects this impression, Calabresi responds by creat-

32. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 23. Calabresi seems to be referring
here
to the various subgoals of the goal of cost reduction or welfare, but the same claim
is all the
more plausible with respect to the general goals of justice and welfare themselves.
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ing the false impression that he, Calabresi, has never believed that
3
such tradeoffs are possible! "

We cannot understand the debate unless we understand that it is
about the possibility, not the permissibility (or justifiability), of tradeoffs between justice and welfare. The permissibility of such tradeoffs
is not irrelevant. But as we shall see later, its only relevance is to the
question of their very possibility.
The point can be brought home by asking this question: How
can Calabresi be said to hold Both Justice and Welfare, which tolerates
tradeoffs between justice and welfare, when he holds Justice Before
Welfare? Surely, the latter doctrine makes justice an absolute constraint on the pursuit of welfare. This surely precludes the trading off
not tolerate tradeof justice for welfare? In his own words: "we would
34
efficiency."
offs between justice and economic
We can make sense of the debate if, but only if, we take Calabresi
to reject tradeoffs of justice for welfare in the sense of holding that

5
they are never morally permissible, but at the same time to accept
that conflicts between justice and welfare are possible and sometimes
actually occur. Indeed, why insist on the moral imperative not to
trade justice for welfare if doing so were not even possible? As Dworkin aptly puts it, the "veto power" with which Calabresi vests justice
"nevertheless supposes that a trade-off is in question-that it is, that is,
6 The only question, then, is whether
conceptually on the cards."
tradeoffs between justice and welfare are indeed in question or con37
ceptually on the cards.
8 HOFSTRA L.
33. Guido Calabresi, About Law & Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin,
held that
have,
never
and
not,
do
("I
Dworkin]
to
Letter
[hereinafter
REv. 553, 557 (1980)
of possibility or the
one can trade off efficiency and justice."). But is this the modal "can"
moral "can" of permissibility?
34. THE COSTS OF AccIDENrs, supra note 1, at 28 n.6.
permitted but
35. Notice that on this view, tradeoffs of welfare for justice are not only
also required.
36. DWORKIN, Why Efficiency?, supra note 5, at 267.
with his the37. Incidentally, Dworkin's position here seems to stand in stark contrast
its declared
Despite
(1977).
SERIOUSLY
RIGHTS
TAKING
DWORKIN,
RONALD
in
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"anti-utilitarian" nature, id. at 269, this theory implicitly acknowledges both the intrinsic
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Id. at 191. Of the idea that rights trump utility considerations, all that seems
Raz, Profesa/soJoseph
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DwoRKIN'S CHALLENGE

In two articles published a decade after Costs, Dworkin takes Calabresi to task over the normative goals of accident law-indeed, over
the normative goals of the law in general.3" Dworkin's purpose is the
ambitious one of rejecting law and economics as a normative theory,
namely as an approach to evaluating, criticizing, and reforming the
law. His aim is to reject this theory root and branch by showing the
roots-namely the underlying value theory-to be no good. Dworkin's claims and arguments in these papers are not always easy to follow, but are always suggestive. What is more, they have proved to be
particularly influential and are sometimes taken to have delivered a
decisive blow to the normative aspirations of law and economics in
general. Indeed, the critique has proven so influential that it has led
Calabresi himself to comment that he has never really disagreed with
39

it!

sorDworkin's Theory of Rights, 26 POL. STUD. 123, 126 (1978) ("Nowhere does
[Dworkin] say
clearly and unambiguously anything more than that rights have some weight
however little
and may override some considerations which aren't themselves rights.").
Second, in the
absence of rights to the contrary, general welfare may justify the government
in limiting
liberty: "The vast bulk of the laws which diminish my liberty are justified
on utilitarian
grounds." DwoiuN, supra, at 269. Third, the existence of a right to "equal
concern and
respect" may be denied by appeal to general welfare, provided only that
this denial is not
"antecedently likely to give effect to external preferences."
Id at 278. Finally, Dworkin
seems to avail himself of the same imagery of tradeoffs to which he claims
Calabresi is not
entitled. For example:
The prospect of utilitarian gains cannotjustify preventing a man from doing
what
he has a right to do .... There would be no point in the boast that we
respect
individual rights unless that involved some sacrifice, and the sacrifice in
question
must be that we give up whatever marginal benefits our country would
receive
from overridingthese rights when they prove inconvenient.
I& at 193 (emphasis added). On the significant utilitarian elements in Dworkin's
theory of
rights, see H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828,
83646 (1979),
reprinted in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 198 (1983).
Notice that
the most fundamental apparent inconsistency between Dworkin's theory
of rights and his
critique of Calabresi does not depend on the above-mentioned details
of his theory of
rights. Rather, the most basic inconsistency is threatened by the simple
fact that Dworkin
shares the common view of rights as deontological constraints. As I have
already mentioned (in note 12 above), this view clearly implies that some tradeoffs between
rights and
welfare are impermissible. Dworkin's critique of Calabresi states that
tradeoffs between
justice and welfare are neither permissible nor impermissible-they are strictly
impossible.
(This point will be reemphasized shortly, in the next Part.) Provided I'm
right that it is
most reasonable to take "justice" in the debate to denote rights, we have
an apparent contradiction. Be that as it may, I shall largely try to understand Dworkin's critique
of normative law and economics as a self-standing doctrine and ignore those parts
of his other views
that do not sit comfortably with it.
38. DWORXIN, Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 5; DWOuuN, Why Efficiency?,
supra note 5.
39. See Calabresi, Letter to Dworkin, supra note 33, at 553 n.1 ("It seems to
me that the
differences between him and me are largely verbal. . . ."). I will take this
response up later.
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My own view is that Calabresi should disagree. In this and the
following Parts I will take Dworkin's argument apart. I will try to show
why, despite its trading on various sound and valuable insights, the
argument ultimately fails to deliver on its self-advertised promise to
shake the normative foundations of the economic approach to law.
The burden of this Part of the Article is to describe and explain
the content of Dworkin's challenge. I will leave the discussion of his
arguments to the Parts that follow. Perhaps the greatest interpretive
difficulty is created by Dworkin's equivocation on whether his critique
concerns wealth or welfare. I have already addressed the issue in the
discussion of welfare in Part II, but the problem is sufficiently important to merit re-emphasis. I shall first describe Dworkin's official project, his critique of the goal of wealth or wealth maximization. I shall
then present what I think are powerful reasons to read it as a critique
of the goal of, first and foremost, welfare. By giving these reasons, I
hope to earn the right to go beyond the critique of wealth and proceed on the assumption that the goal that is really at issue is welfare.
A.

The Critique of Wealth

As we shall see in Part VIII, Dworkin's more recent thoughts
about the tradeoff issue concern the value of welfare or well-being,
not wealth. It is true, however, that the official target of his original,
1980 critique is the goal of wealth or wealth maximization, not welfare. The target, however, is not the familiar and very strong claim
that wealth should be the only goal of the law-that the law should
maximize wealth or efficiency single-mindedly--but rather the much
weaker claim that the law should pursue the goal of wealth or wealth
maximization at all.4 ° Specifically, Dworkin targets "the idea that justice and social wealth may sensibly be traded off against each other,
making some sacrifice in one to achieve more of the other," and the
notion that the goals of justice and wealth "may sometimes conflict so
that a 'political' choice is needed about which goal should be pursued."4 1 Dworkin's own official view then seems to be that justice and
social wealth can never conflict. This is what he seems to be saying
when he says that "[n] one of these interpretations of the trade-off between justice and wealth makes sense."42
40. See DWORKIN, Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 5, at 246 ("I did not argue that maximizing social wealth is only one among a number of plausible social goals, or is a mean, unattractive, or unpopular social goal. I argued that it makes no sense as a social goal, even as
one among others.").
41. I at 246.
42. Id. at 249.
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To be sure, it may be natural to think that, in saying that talk of
trading offjustice for wealth does not "make sense," Dworkin is claiming that such tradeoffs are inappropriate or even impermissible (or
unjustifiable). Indeed, the paper in which he first unleashes the critique of Calabresi (Is Wealth a Value?) does not explicitly rule this interpretation out. Yet, as soon as Dworkin realizes the potential
ambiguity of his claim, he writes another paper (Why Efficiency?) that
disambiguates it, with a clear view to save the controversy. He emphasizes that his claim is not the first-order one that we are never morally
permitted to trade off justice for welfare. That claim, he acknowledges, would fail to engage Calabresi's position, which includes the
doctrine that justice is a constraint on welfare enhancement. Dworkin's claim is the second-order one that there can be no conflicts, and
so no tradeoffs, between justice and wealth in thefirst place. For him,
Calabresi's notion that it is never permissible to sacrifice justice in the
cause of wealth makes no more sense than the otherwise diametrically
opposed notion that this is always permissible!
Dworkin's claim is entirely general and value theoretic. He is after Calabresi's supposed value theory "that social wealth is worth pursuing for some reason distinct from justice."4" If we are to choose the
all-things-considered morally best society, he asks, "why should not its
justice alone matter?"4 4 One possible answer, he says, is that justice, in
the "ordinary language" or "political philosophy" sense, "is not the
only virtue of a good society."4 5 The other possible answer concedes
that justice in that relatively wide sense is indeed the only virtue of a
good society, but insists that the good society has virtues other than
justice in the narrower, "distributional" or "desert" sense.4 6 Dworkin
rejects both answers because
they both assume that wealth maximization is a component
of social value. In the first, wealth maximization is treated as
a component competitive with justice and, in the second, as
a component of justice but competitive with other components of that concept. Both replies fail, for that reason. It is
absurd to consider wealth maximization to be a component
of value, within or without the concept of justice.4 7
What does Dworkin mean by saying that wealth is not a value or a
component thereof? For him, some putative goal or value is a compo43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

DWORKIN,

Why Efficiency?, supra note 5, at 262.

DWORKIN, IS Wealth a Value?, supra note 5, at 248.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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nent of value just in case it is "worth having for its own sake," or wor4
thy of our appreciation when "considered in itself." By "value," in
other words, Dworkin seems to mean what is often called intrinsic,
non-instrumental value. Roughly speaking, an intrinsically valuable or
normative goal is a goal worth satisfying not simply as a means to the
satisfaction of some other goal but at least partly as a distinct basic
goal in its own right. Somewhat differently, but still in the same vein,
we can say that a goal has intrinsic value just in case, all other things
being equal, a world in which the goal is satisfied is better, or has more
value, than a world in which it is not satisfied.
I would like to pause to observe the strength of Dworkin's claim
by emphasizing the weakness of his component-of-value condition. In
denying that wealth is a component of value, Dworkin seems to claim
somewhat more than is absolutely necessary to preclude tradeoffs between wealth and justice. This much he could achieve by insisting
that wealth's value depends on justice: whether wealth exerts intrinsic
normative force in any given case depends on whether justice has already been given its due. Such insistence would not imply that wealth
never exerts intrinsic normative force, that its value is entirely derivative ofjustice. It would allow that, as long as justice is satisfied, wealth
may exert basic, nonderivative intrinsic normative force. Instead,
Dworkin chooses to deny the possibility of tradeoffs between wealth
and justice by denying wealth's most basic claim to be a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal.
B. From Wealth to Welfare
Dworkin takes Calabresi's cost reduction goal to be the goal of
maximizing social wealth or economic efficiency. He takes him to
hold "the theory that social wealth is worth pursuing for some reason
distinct from justice. '"" There are, however, powerful reasons to resist
this reading-at least insofar as the reason in question is supposed to
lie in the intrinsic value of wealth. In particular, there are powerful
reasons to believe that Dworkin's challenge is first and foremost about
the value of welfare.
First, Dworkin's criticism can only engage Calabresi's position if it
is taken to apply to the goal of welfare as well. As I pointed out in Part
II, Calabresian costs and benefits are best conceived of as welfare costs
and benefits. There is no special reason to saddle him with the view
that wealth is a component of value in the sense of being valuable for
48. IM at 240, 242.
49. DWORKIN, Why Efficiency?, supra note 5, at 267.
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its own sake. On the contrary, it is more than reasonable to attribute
to Calabresi the view that wealth is valuable for the sake of welfare.5"
More important, Dworkin himself has a compelling reason to endorse my reformulation of his challenge in terms of welfare rather
than wealth or efficiency. This is because the declared ultimate purpose of his challenge, as we have already seen, is to refute the "political theory about law often called the economic analysis of law," to
argue that the economic approach in general "lacks any philosophical
foundation." No doubt any version of this normative theory claims
that the promotion of social wealth or economic efficiency may be a
worthy goal for the law to pursue. But this does not yet tell us that
wealth is worthy of pursuit in its own right. At the same time, the
claim that welfare is intrinsically valuable is clearly the most plausible
candidate for playing the role of the value theory behind the widespread contemporary appeal to wealth or efficiency. On this interpretation, the value claim that normative law and economics makes on
behalf of wealth is essentially conditional. Specifically, it is conditional upon the assumption that the promotion of social wealth promotes social welfare. When the assumption is not justified, the value
claim is automatically withdrawn.
Given Dworkin's explicit aspiration to reject normative law and
economics root and branch, he should extend his critique beyond a
particular-indeed, tendentious-branch of that theory.
Dworkin could reply in the following manner. The original critique really refutes two kinds of claims on behalf of normative law and
economics. In addition to the claim that wealth is a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal that is appropriate for the law to pursue, the critique also refutes the claim that wealth is an instrumentally valuable
goal that is appropriate for the law to pursue. The champion of the
economic approach must choose between these two kinds of claims.
But it does not matter which claim he chooses because both have
51
been shown to be without warrant.
50. Remember that even Posner, who flirts with the view that wealth is valuable for its
own sake, at some point disclaims it and asserts that the value of wealth maximization is
instrumental. Posner, The Value of Wealth, supra note 23, at 244-45. (But cf supra note 27,
where I note that Posner's considered view is somewhat ambiguous.) Dworkin responds to
this by saying that his critique "was designed only to show, if it needed showing, that wealth
could not be supposed to be valuable for its own sake." Dworkin, A Reply, supra note 20, at
295 (emphasis added). This may or may not cut ice against Posner, but it certainly cuts no
ice against Calabresi and most other economic analysts who have not been tempted by the
view that wealth is a factor of intrinsic ethical significance. Cf also infra note 71.
51. Cf DwoRJUN, Is Wealth a Value, supra note 5, at 240-41. Here Dworkin enumerates
five interpretations of normative economic analysis. The first two regard wealth as intrinsi-
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But I do not think Dworkin's discussion of the instrumental views
is pertinent to the tradeoffs debate. As he notes, these versions of
economic analysis are incompatible with the possibility of tradeoffs be52
But surely they leave intact the possibility
tween justice and wealth.
of tradeoffs between justice and welfare. What is more, the instrumental claims at issue are, at bottom, empirical generalizations. Even
if Dworkin's discussion successfully undermined them, it would not
affect the most fundamental normative premise that informs economic analysis, to wit, that welfare is an intrinsically valuable goal that
is appropriate for the law to pursue, either directly or through the
pursuit of wealth, that is in cases where wealth can be shown to be
conducive to welfare. 53
For these reasons, it is reasonable to examine how Dworkin's critique would fare as a view about justice and welfare, not simply justice
and wealth. Now, admittedly, the claim that welfare is not intrinsically
valuable scarcely enjoys the overwhelming plausibility of the claim
that wealth is not intrinsically valuable. On the face of it, all other
things being equal, a world in which even one person enjoys more
cally valuable, while the other three regard it as instrumental toward some other, intrinsically valuable goal. Id.; see also Dworkin, A Reply, supra note 20, at 295.
52. DWORKIN, IS Wealth a Value?, supra note 5, at 248.
53. A digression: Provided only that Dworkin's instrumental variations on economic
analysis are properly interpreted, I also doubt that his discussion successfully undermines
any of them. He interprets these claims to be strongly instrumental: they presuppose that
"judges should pursue wealth single-mindedly over some class of cases specified independently of the instrumental claim itself." Id.at 250. But first, the normative reach of economic analysis extends to lawmaking generally and is hardly confined to judicial
lawmaking. The choice of accident systems or rules, for instance, may be legislative or
regulative. More important, it is far from clear why a viable law and economics must issue
in the absolute commands to pursue wealth single-mindedly over any class of cases. Suppose
that legislative choices of products liability rules are generally likely to enhance welfare if
they are designed to enhance wealth. A generalization of this kind focuses on the typical
case and countenances the possibility of cases where the choice of liability rules is not likely
to enhance welfare. We can think of a principle addressed to legislators that directs them
to choose the products liability rule that maximizes wealth unless there is some good reason to believe that it will not. To be sure, legislators may not be in a position to apply this
principle properly, depending on, among other things, the information they have. But
they may also be in such a position. In any event, the difficulty is not normative or value
theoretic, but applicative. Compare the distinction between normative standards and decision procedures in Adler & Posner, supra note 29, at 216-25. And it is the normative question that concerns us here, exclusively. Finally, why would anyone who rejects the view that
welfare is the only intrinsically valuable goal ever wish to hold that the law should enhance
is implausible to think that a society
welfare single-mindedly? Dworkin argues that "[i]t
that seeks wealth maximization single-mindedly will achieve more total utility than a society
that seeks wealth maximization but puts an upper bound on the level of inequality it will
tolerate in the name of social wealth." DWORIN, Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 5, at 260.
Yes, but this is no objection to a minimally pluralist law and economics in which justice is a
constraint on welfare enhancement.
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welfare is better than a world in which that person has less. But even
if Dworkin's critique can do without denying the distinct, intrinsic
value of welfare, it certainly cannot do without denying the kind of
value independence that would enable welfare to conflict with, and be
traded off against, justice. We shall see that Dworkin also seems to
endorse this denial in his more recent reflections on justice and welfare. In any event, this denial is absolutely essential to his valuetheoretic critique of law and economics.
Our primary question shall therefore be whether it is possible for
justice and welfare to conflict. Moreover, in Part VIII, I shall specifically examine Dworkin's considered view, which seeks to deny welfare's independence from justice without also denying its claim to
intrinsic value.
IV.

THE EXAMPLE-BASED ARGUMENT

The story of Derek and Amartya is the linchpin of Dworkin's
critique:
Derek has a book Amartya wants. Derek would sell the book
to Amartya for $2 and Amartya would pay $3 for it. T (the
tyrant in charge) takes the book from Derek and gives it to
Amartya with less waste in money or its equivalent than
would be consumed in transaction costs if the two were to
haggle over the distribution of the $1 surplus value. The
forced transfer from Derek to Amartya produces a gain in
social wealth even though Derek has lost something he values with no compensation. Let us call the situation before
the forced transfer takes place "Society 1" and the situation
after it takes place "Society 2." Is Society 2 in any respect superior to Society 1? I do not mean whether the gain in wealth
is overridden by the cost injustice, or in equal treatment, or
in anything else, but whether the gain in wealth is, considered in itself, any gain at all. I should say, and I think most
people would agree, that Society 2 is not better in any
respect.5 4
Dworkin clearly regards this story as a decisive counterexample to the
claim that wealth is a component of value; a proof that wealth is not a
distinct, intrinsically valuable goal at all. 55
54. DWORKIN, Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 5, at 242.
55. For example, he later states that
the Derek-Amartya story shows the failure not only of the immodest but also of
the modest version of the theory that social wealth is a component of value ....
It
shows that a gain in social wealth, considered just in itself, and apart from its costs
or other good or bad consequences, is no gain at all.
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I disagree. As we shall see, Dworkin's argument does not even
support the weaker view that wealth's value depends on justice in a
way that precludes conflicts between the two.
A.

The Basic Problem

Dworkin assumes that "most people" would say Society 2 is "not
better in any respect" than Society 1. But the most Dworkin is entitled
to assume "most people" would say is that Society 1 is clearly better
than Society 2, that is to say, clearly better overall. Surely, to assume
more-namely that Society 2 is in no way better, not even pro
tanto6-is to beg the question against those who think that wealth is
valuable independent of justice in such a way that the two goals may
come into conflict.
Rather than a noncontroversial assumption about our shared reaction to the case, this further assumption is merely Dworkin's controversial gloss on the reasonable assumption that Society 1 is clearly
better on balance. But someone who thinks wealth may conflict with
justice has another gloss handy: that the injustice of the transition to
Society 2 clearly outweighs the additional, genuine, if smallish, wealth
For all that Dworkin says, this gloss is just as
value it creates.
57
explanatory.
B.

Another Problem

This problem, I think, more than justifies the rejection of Dworkin's critique of wealth and, by implication, its welfare-related interpretation. It is not the only problem with his argument, however.
Consider the assumption that the pre-transfer Society 1 is clearly better overall than the post-transfer Society 2. Now as I said, this assumption is in fact reasonable. And perhaps it is also reasonable to believe
that most people would accept it. But while the assumption is reasonable, it is not clear that it is capable of supplying the premise that Dworkin really needs for his argument to go through. Proving that justice
and welfare do not conflict in some particular case would only prove
Id. at 246. The story is the only evidence cited for the claim that "[i]t is absurd to consider
wealth maximization to be a component of value." Id. at 248.
56. Id. at 242.
57. Notice that if Dworkin's entire point in bringing the example is to refute the intrinsic value of wealth, then the problem identified in the text is more fundamental still. I
questioned the assumption that (most people would say) Society 2 is better than Society 1
in no intrinsically significant respect. The trouble is that even if the assumption is in fact
impeccable, it is still compatible with saying that wealth might have intrinsic value. In
particular, it might have intrinsic moral significance in the absence of injustice. This point
is rehearsed in the next Part. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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the truism that such conflicts are not necessary. Dworkin's example is
supposed to show that they are not possible, either. To do that, the
reaction induced must not depend on contingent features of the example. But there is some reason to believe that the assumption that
Society 1 is better overall depends precisely on such features: to believe that it would not survive a legitimate modification of the
example.
To see this, notice, first, that the increase in wealth is both very
small and indeterminate. Not only is the difference between the respective valuations of the parties a mere $1, but Dworkin also does not
exclude the possibility that the parties would voluntarily exchange the
book for money if the forced transfer did not take place. In fact, he
seems to assume that the book would end up in Amartya's hands anyway. He seems to assume, in other words, that transaction costs are
not prohibitive; that they are smaller than $1. Hence, the only reason
why the forced transfer guarantees a net increase in social wealth is
that transaction costs are not quite zero. For all we know, the net
wealth gain associated with the forced transfer is 1/1,000,000 cents!
By contrast, the taking of one's property without his ex ante consent or ex post compensation is a paradigm of rights violation or injustice. Presumably, the forced transfer would still be unjust even if
Derek were fully compensated for his book in the amount of $2. Yet,
in the example, Derek is not even given partial compensation.
In sum, even if Dworkin's intuition about his own case were right,
nothing would follow as to the status of wealth. For there is nothing
in his argument to preclude the possibility that some relevantly similar
yet different case would induce a contrary intuition.
V.

Is

WELFARE A VALUE?

Of course, that Dworkin's critique fails to show that wealth is not
a component of value or something worth having for its own sake has
no tendency to show that it is. In fact, I think Dworkin is entirely
correct that wealth is not a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal. As I
hope was clear from the discussion thus far (especially in Part II.B), I
find the view that wealth is a basic normative factor in its own right
rather implausible. But I also tend to think that this has little to do
with wealth's relation to justice and much to do with its relation to
welfare. And it is the value of welfare that should concern us most.
In this Part, I wish to show how considerations arising from Dworkin's forced-transfer example provide a positive reason to believe that
welfare is a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal. In the next Part (VI), I
shall argue that similar considerations also provide a positive reason to
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believe that welfare is valuable independent of justice in a way that
enables the two goals to conflict.
The first order of business is to explain why we must modify
Dworkin's original example in order to make progress on these questions. The reason is simple. Dworkin uses his Derek-Amartya story to
show that wealth is not a component of value, and declares that "[i] t
shows that a gain in social wealth, consideredjust in itself, and apartfrom
its costs or other good or bad consequences, is no gain at all.""8 But how can
this be true, when the story actually considers a gain in social wealth
together with its justice costs or bad (because unjust) consequences? To
put it another way, what is at issue for Dworkin is the claim that, all
other things being equal, the more wealth, the better. But on the face of
it, not all other things in Dworkin's original forced-transfer example
are equal. In particular, justice supports the choice of Society 1 and
opposes the choice of Society 2. That is quite a difference." °
A.

FirstModification and the Pareto Objection

Let us tweak the example to make it engage the question of
whether wealth is a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal. To do so, we
need to eliminate the difference in justice between the two societies.
The simplest way of achieving this is by making the transfer voluntary.
Assume that transaction costs are zero and Amartya and Derek do the
economically right thing and exchange the book for a price between
$2 and $3. To depart as little as possible from the original example,
assume that they exchange the book for $2 and Amartya gets to keep
the entire $1 surplus. This surplus is a gain in the overall wealth of
the parties and is achieved without injustice.
My intuition is that Society 2 is on balance better now. This falls
far short of establishing that wealth is a component of value. In partic7
58. DWORK1N, IS Wealth a Value , supra note 5, at 246 (emphasis added).
59. Notice that this failure-to-engage problem is related to, but different from, the one
I identified in Part IV.A ("The Basic Problem"). In a way, it is even more basic. What I
took to be the basic problem with Dworkin's example-based argument is the lack of warrant to assume that (most people would say) Society 2 is in no genuine respect better than
Society 1. The failure-to-engage problem, on the other hand, is that even the said unwarranted assumption is compatible with the denial of what Dworkin officially takes the example to show, namely that "a gain in social wealth, considered just in itself. . . is no gain at
all." After all, the fact that a wealth increase has no intrinsic significance when accompanied by injustice leaves open the possibility that such an increase is intrinsically valuable
when unaccompanied by injustice. In another way, however, the basic problem identified
in Part IV.A is more fundamental. Not only does it tend to undermine Dworkin's official
claim that the example supports the rejection of the basic and intrinsic normative status of
wealth; it also tends to undermine his less ambitious purpose of rejecting the possibility of
tradeoffs between justice and wealth.
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ular, it is very plausible to explain my intuition by saying that the increase in wealth corresponds to an increase in welfare. But if so, my
intuition seems to support the view that welfare is a component of
value.
I assume that Dworkin would react in something like the follow60
way:
ing
Look. In your modified example, at least one affected party
(Amartya) gains something (wealth), and the only other affected party (Derek) doesn't lose anything: Society 2 is
Pareto superior to Society 1. Surely, it is this feature of the
move-not the extra overall wealth or welfare-that makes it
better on balance!
What are we to make of this objection? The safest reply is to eliminate
the Pareto factor from the example altogether.
B.

Second Modication

Suppose that everything is exactly as in Dworkin's original example, except that neither party has the book. Instead, T (the tyrant in
charge) owns the book and is forced to give it to Derek or Amartya. T
knows about their respective valuations of the book. Transaction costs
are prohibitive (greater than $1). T gives the book to Amartya. If
Society 2 is the resulting society and Society 1 is the counterfactual
society in which Derek would have had the book, which society is
better?6 1
My intuition is that Society 2 is better than Society 1. Yet neither
society is Pareto superior to the other. Each choice involves a loser as
well as a winner.6 2 The elimination of the Pareto factor fails to affect
my intuition in the voluntary exchange version of the case. This tends
to confirm the hypothesis that what made me prefer Society 2 in the
voluntary exchange version is something that corresponds to the
wealth improvement, probably a welfare improvement.
Suppose now that T gave the book to Derek. Would we not wish
that T had not done so? But this regret cannot be attributed to the
failure to make a Pareto improvement, because each of the two alter60. Cf DWORKIN, Why Efficiency?, supra note 5, at 271-72. For a brief endorsement of
Dworkin's Pareto point, see Calabresi, Letter to Dworkin, supra note 33, at 554 n.1.
61. Notice that, unlike in Dworkin's original version of the example, it matters not
whether the question is about all-things-considered or pro tanto betterness: Society 2 is allthings-considered better if and only if it is pro tanto better.
62. To be sure, both societies are Pareto superior to the parent society, but that society
is not an option.
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natives is Pareto superior to the status quo and neither is Pareto superior to the other.6 3
Whereas Dworkin's original example fails to engage the hypothesis that wealth is a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal, modified examples that engage this hypothesis also tend to support it or, what is
more likely, its welfare-based corollary. I think this is sufficient to shift
the burden of proof to those who think that welfare is not a distinct,
intrinsically valuable goal.
VI.

TRADEOFFS BETWEEN JUSTICE AND WELFARE

A.

StartingAfresh

To test the hypothesis that welfare is a component of value in
Dworkin's sense, we had to eliminate the injustice from his example,
and thereby eliminate conflicts between justice and welfare. But arguably, the rejection of this hypothesis is not the only option that can
give Dworkin what he really needs in the debate, namely the result
that tradeoffs between justice and welfare are impossible. The
other-and as far as I can tell, only other-position that can do the
trick holds that welfare is a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal that nevertheless depends on justice for its value in a way that prevents the two
from ever diverging. In this view, the goal of welfare, which is otherwise distinctly and intrinsically valuable, has no value at all unless the
goal of justice is satisfied. Equivalently, the satisfaction of justice is a
condition on the intrinsic value or normative force of welfare. This is a
plausible interpretation of Dworkin's critique. On the one hand, it
avoids the rather contentious claim that welfare is not a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal at all. On the other, it preserves Dworkin's
primary claim, that conflicts or tradeoffs between justice and welfare
are not possible. We shall also see in Part VIII that this view best reflects Dworkin's more recent position.
To test the hypothesis that the value of welfare is conditional
upon justice being satisfied, we need to try to describe a conflict between justice and welfare and see if we succeed. To achieve this, we
must do two things. We must revert to a version of the example that
includes injustice. And we must make sure that the increase in wealth
is accompanied by an increase in welfare.6 4
63. Cf supra note 60 (referencing Dworkin's and Calabresi's positions, according to
which the regret is over the failure to effect a Pareto improvement).
64. The word "welfare" here must not be read too literally. It should be taken to mean
something like "perceived welfare." On pain of begging the question, we must not assume
that a welfare increase in the face of injustice has any normative force, that it is a genuine
welfare increase. But we are entitled to assume that a welfare increase is accompanied by
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Dworkin himself considers the possibility that some people do
not share his intuition and would insist that the post-transfer, wealthier society is pro tanto better, even if not on balance.6 5 He then raises
the eminently plausible hypothesis that these people must be making
the further assumption that the transfer of the book "will increase
overall utility as well as wealth. '66 He concludes that he "must thus
make [his] example more specific. '67 At this point, you might expect
Dworkin to make the example more specific so as to test the view that
utility or welfare is valuable intrinsically and independently of justice.
After all, this is probably the most plausible interpretation of the value
theory at the heart of law and economics. You might expect him, in
other words, to tweak the example with a view to describe a conflict
between justice and welfare, and then explain why he thinks the conflict is merely apparent.
But this is not how Dworkin proceeds. Having noted that "Posner, at least, is now explicit that wealth is conceptually independent of
utility," 68 he modifies the example so as to refute the particular, and

particularly contentious, version of normative economic analysis that
takes wealth to be valuable independently of welfare:
Derek is poor and sick and miserable, and the book is one of
his few comforts. He is willing to sell it for $2 only because
he needs medicine. Amartya is rich and content. He is willing to spend $3 for the book, which is a very small part of his
wealth, on the odd chance that he might someday read it,
although he knows that he probably will not. If the tyrant
makes the transfer with no compensation, total utility will
sharply fall. But wealth, as specifically defined, will improve .... I ask whether if the tyrant acts, the situation will
69
be in any way an improvement. I believe it will not.

This seems quite right: the wealth improvement under these circumstances will not amount to a genuine value improvement. But what
exactly is this meant to show? On the one hand, it cannot show that
wealth depends on, or derives its value from, justice. Surely, we would
still think that the post-transfer society is in no genuine way better
even apart from the injustice, say, if the transfer were voluntary. On
the other hand, if the modified example were designed to show that
an increase in what intuitively appears to be personal welfare or some constitutive component thereof.
65. DWORKIN, Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 5, at 244.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 244-45.
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wealth depends on, or derives its value from, welfare, then it is not
clear what role the injustice of the forced transfer is supposed to play
in the argument.
Needless to say, Dworkin's modification of the example fails to
engage any claim about the relation between justice and welfare. Ex
hypothesi, the example involves the opposite of welfare improvement.
Rather than pitting justice and welfare against each other, the example makes them pull in the exact same direction. In failing to engage
the most plausible candidate for the normative premise behind normative economic analysis, Dworkin fails to give this popular approach
a run for its money.
B.

Third Modification

To engage this plausible theory, we have to modify the story in
the opposite direction. Far from driving a wedge between wealth and
welfare, we need to build a bridge between the two. Notice that since
Dworkin's thesis is about what is possible, there is surely nothing sacred
about his numbers. Suppose then that while Derek values the book at
$2 as before, Amartya values it at $300. Moreover, suppose that, unlike in Dworkin's modified example, Derek is the one who is rich and
content, and has all the medicine he needs. He is only minimally interested in the book. Amartya, on the other hand, is strongly interested in the book, for personal or idiosyncratic reasons having to do
with its content, special history, and appearance. It is virtually certain
that he would read it repeatedly and use it as a source of inspiration
for a play he is currently writing. To keep things simple, assume that
transaction costs are prohibitive.7" Now ask Dworkin's original question: Is the post-transfer Society 2, which appears to satisfy better the
goal of welfare, in any way better than the pre-transfer Society 1, which
presumably better satisfies the goal of justice?"
70. How could transaction costs rise above $298? I simply stipulate that they do, to
force the choice between (1) a society with clearly greater welfare plus an injustice, and (2)
a society with clearly less welfare minus that injustice. Either we are entitled to assume that
transaction costs are higher than zero or we are not. But if we are, then whether they are
less than $1 (as in Dworkin's example) or more than $1 is a technical question. And if they
are more than $1, whether they are only a little or much more is also technical.
71. I think Posner is exactly right to note that "[t]he relationship between wealth and
utility is obscured by the particular numbers which Dworkin uses in his example." Posner,
The Value of Wealth, supra note 23, at 245. Dworkin's following response is strictly applicable
to my own treatment of his example:
[Posner] asks us to assume, directly contrary to the assumption I made, that overall utility would be improved by stealing the book from Derek and giving it to
Amartya. But my purpose was to show that wealth maximization could only be
thought useful if it happens to improve utility or produces some other gain it
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My own intuition is that yes, Society 2 is in some real, ethically
relevant sense better. To my thinking, if Society 1 is still better all
things considered, it is so in spite of the fact that Society 2 is better in
some genuine, ethically significant way; that is to say with respect to
welfare. My own reaction to the example, in other words, is conflictual.
Opting for Society 1 would be a tradeoff in favor ofjustice; opting for
Society 2 would be a tradeoff in favor of welfare. Neither option is a
win-win situation.
But if tradeoffs between justice and welfare are not even "in question" or "conceptually on the cards," then my modified example involves no genuine conflict of values and gives no occasion for a
tradeoff. If we opt for Society 1, we do not simply make the right
decision on balance; we manage to do so without sacrificing anything
of value. If we opt for Society 2 instead, we do not simply make the
wrong decision; we do not even gain anything of value. My conflictual
intuition must be condemned as irrational, confused, or arbitrary.
To the extent that you share my intuition, we have a reason to
believe that justice and welfare conflict and to reject Dworkin's challenge. Our intuitions may fail us, and we should always be open to the
possibility of an argument that exposes them as irrational or otherwise
mistaken. But Dworkin voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of our
intuitions. In fact, it is not clear that his example-based argument appeals to anything but intuition. Either we sufficiently trust our intuitions to regard them as reasons for belief or we do not. If we do not,
Dworkin's example-based argument against the tradeoffs view does
not get off the ground. But if we do, then if our intuition is conflicted, we should regard it as a reason for subscribing to the tradeoff
view.
VII.

THE ANALoGY-BASED ARGUMENT

The argument of Is Wealth a Value? sets out to refute normative
economic analysis in general. But, in fact, it is "largely, though not
entirely" concerned with the arguments of Posner.7 2 This goes some
way to explain Dworkin's failure to confront explicitly and clearly the
normative status of welfare and its relation to justice. In the companmakes sense to value for its own sake. So Posner has changed the subject as well
as the example.
Dworkin, A Reply, supra note 20, at 295. My point is precisely that we should change the
example (and perhaps also the subject, at least if it is the normative status of wealth).
Otherwise, Dworkin's critique would be too weak to defeat a plausible version of normative
law and economics.
72. DWORKIN, Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 5, at 237.
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ion article, Why Efficiency?, Dworkin is more directly concerned with
Calabresi's "modest version" of normative economic analysis.7 3 Since
there is no good reason to think that this or any other modest version
of normative law and economics regards wealth as an ultimate, intrinsically valuable goal of the law, perhaps this is the place to address the
value of welfare directly.
The problem is that the companion article continues not to engage directly the most plausible interpretation of the value theory at
work in Calabresian law and economics: indeed, in any plausible normative law and economics. It massively plays down the difference between that interpretation and the "immodest" version attributed to
Posner. Here, as in the original article, Dworkin writes as if the sole
issue on which the two versions of law and economics can be said to
diverge is whether wealth is the only distinct and independently valuable goal that is appropriate for the law to pursue. This assumes that
both versions share the theory that wealth is a "component of value"
and is valuable for its own sake and apart from its contribution to
welfare. As a result, the official target of the companion article continues to be this rather contentious claim, instead of the plausible
value theory that welfare is intrinsically and independently valuable.
This, however, should not matter. As before, if the argument fails
to show that wealth depends for its value on, and so cannot conflict
with, justice, then it obviously fails to show that welfare depends for its
value on, and cannot conflict with, justice. Somewhat more surprisingly, the converse also seems to hold true of Dworkin's argument. It
seems to me to be a feature of his argument that, if it fails as an argument against the intrinsic value of welfare and its independence of
justice, then it must also fail as an argument against the intrinsic value
of wealth and its independence of justice. Nothing in the argument,
in other words, seems to turn on whether the goal that can or cannot
possibly conflict with justice is wealth or welfare. Given our primary
concern, we might as well interpret it in terms of welfare.
A.

Recipe and Compromise

Dworkin's argumentative strategy in the companion article is to
re-describe the competing views in the debate-Calabresi's view that
welfare is valuable independently from justice (in the conflict-enabling sense), and Dworkin's own view that it is not-as two alternative,
mutually exclusive ways of regarding the "right mix" of the two puta-

73. DWORKIN, Why Efficiency?, supra note 5, at 267-75.
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tive values: a "compromise" and a "recipe."74 The nerve of the argument, as I understand it, is that once the two ways of regarding the
right mix are explicitly spelled out, we would converge on the intuition that the right mix between welfare and justice is a recipe. Yet
since there is no material difference between the recipe view and the
claim that welfare cannot conflict with justice, this convergence tells
against Calabresi's tradeoffs' view.
Dworkin's argument therefore turns crucially on his distinction
between compromise and recipe. He offers an interesting test for distinguishing between the two, which he describes by contrasting two
examples. I italicize the parts from which the test can be gleaned:
[First, the field example:] Someone who likes both parkland
and crops, for example, must think about the best mix of
park and cultivated fields on his property. He wants as much
as he can have of each, but since the total property is limited
these desires conflict, so he must sacrifice some of what he
wants to have more of something else he wants. If he has chosen a particularmix as the "right"mix, and subsequently discovers a
way to produce more crops from the land he has cultivated, he will
regard this as an obvious and unqualified improvement....
[Next, the cake example:] This "compromise" sense of a
trade-off or right mix must be distinguished from the "recipe" sense, in which some mix of ingredients is the right mix
only because it will produce the best final product. Someone
making a cake may be concerned about the right mix of
flour and eggs, not because he independently values each
and wants as much as he can have of both, but because a
particular mix is better than any other mix for making cakes.
Suppose the right mix is two eggs to a cup of flour. A baker
who is told that, in fact, he can add three eggs without thereby decreasing the flour he may add will not think that this suggestion
points the way
to an improvement in this situation, but only the way
75
to disaster.
I think Dworkin has in mind the following test. We are to suppose,
first, that a decisionmaker has chosen a particular mix of elements (or
considerations) as the "right" one, and second, that he subsequently
discovers a way to have (or satisfy) more of one of them without having less of (or frustrating) the other(s). We then ask: Will she regard
this as an obvious and unqualified improvement? If yes, we have identified
a compromise (as in the field example); otherwise, we have identified
74. See id. at 267-69.
75. Id. at 267-68 (emphasis added).

20051

TRADEOFFS BETWEEN JUSTICE AND WELFARE

a recipe (as in the cake example). Dworkin seems to think that the
application of this test to the right mix between justice and welfare
76
should yield a clear recipe verdict. Mixingjustice with welfare is like
mixing eggs and flour and unlike mixing park and cultivated land. If
we agree, perhaps we implicitly commit ourselves to the view that welfare is not a distinct, intrinsically normative value, and in any event to
the view that its value depends on justice in a way that renders conflicts impossible.
The "obvious and unqualified improvement" test is unsound. It
crucially equivocates on "the right mix." Consider: If the chosen mix
really is the right one, then the decisionmaker cannot possibly discover a way of having more of one element without having less of the
other. (If he could, then the newly discovered mix would surely be
betterthan the originally chosen mix.) On this reading, the field example is incomprehensible. But if the chosen mix need only be apparently right-if it is enough that the decisionmaker or anyone else
believed or justifiably believed it to be right-then it is always possible
to answer Dworkin's question in the affirmative, including in what
Dworkin treats as recipe cases. On this reading, the cake example
may well yield a compromise verdict, after all. To see this, suppose
that despite the baker's initial, justified or unjustified, belief that the
right recipe calls for two eggs for every cup of flour, it really calls for
three. On discovering his mistake, a good baker will regard the addition of a third egg as an obvious and unqualified improvement. By
applying one test to the first example and another test to the second,
Dworkin is trying to have his cake and eat it, too.
B.

The Cake Analogy

I wish, however, to stay a little with Dworkin's cake analogy. Let
us suppose that the correct recipe is two eggs for every cup of flour.
How should we interpret the analogy? What exactly is analogous to
what here? It is abundantly clear that welfare in real life is analogous
to the eggs in the example. After all, the obvious fact that simply having more eggs cannot improve the cake-that foregoing a third egg
involves no sacrifice at all-is supposed to make us realize that simply
having more welfare cannot improve overall value in society. But
then, what is justice analogous to?
I see exactly two possibilities. On a symmetrical interpretation,
justice is analogous to the flour (as welfare is to the eggs). But the
symmetrical nature of this interpretation, which makes it natural, also
76. Id, at 271-73.
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makes it self-defeating. Surely, eggs and flour are on strictly equal
footing as cake ingredients. If the analogy has any tendency to show
that eggs (-welfare) are not a component of value worth having for its
own sake (or at least that they are not valuable independently from
the flour/justice), then we can easily turn the example around to
show that flour (justice) is not a component of value worth having for
its own sake (or at least that it is not valuable independently from the
eggs/welfare). Surely, adding a second cup of flour makes no more
culinary sense than adding a third egg.
This, then, cannot be Dworkin's intended interpretation of the
analogy. On the only other natural interpretation, justice in real life is
analogous to the correctly baked cake in the example. Indeed, it
seems to me that Dworkin's discussion tends to equate the right decision, all things considered, with what is just. This tendency finds expression in his assertion that, if what we care about is "the morally best
society, all things considered," then the "very idea of a trade-off between justice and wealth now becomes mysterious. If the individual is
to choose the morally best society, why should not its justice alone
matter?"7 7 However, the asymmetrical interpretation of the analogy
threatens to vitiate the debate (or beg the question). Dworkin appears to be claiming that it makes no good sense ever to consider
trading offjustice for welfare. Arguably, Calabresi would wish to make
the reverse claim. (Hence the controversy.) But if justice is defined as
what is, all things considered, right, then of course it makes little sense
to talk about genuine conflicts between justice and welfare, or any
other putative value for that matter. Calabresi would not wish to deny
that. And we hardly need any elaborate argument to deliver this
result. 78
C.

Calabresi'sResponse

Dworkin's challenge had prompted Calabresi to restate his position on the goals of accident law. 79 The response inherits the key am77. DWORKIN, Is Wealth a Value?, supra note 5, at 248.
78. Compare Calabresi, Letter to Dworkin, supra note 33, at 553 n. 1 (the disagreement is
"largely verbal"), with Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, supra note 5, at 572-73 (arguing in a Postscript included in the original published version of the article, but not included in the
reprinted version, that the disagreement is genuine). It is always better to presume a disagreement genuine, and this is what I have been doing throughout. Alas, this presumption
would be rebutted by the stipulation that 'justice" denotes what is all-things-considered
best or what is right on balance, morally speaking.
79. See Calabresi, Letter to Dworkin, supra note 33; see also Guido Calabresi, The New Economic Analysis of Law: Scholarship, Sophistry, or Self-Indulgence?, 68 PROC. BrT. ACAD. 85
(1982).
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biguities of Dworkin's critique-in particular the equivocation
between wealth or efficiency and welfare-and, more to the point,
between the permissibility of tradeoffs and their possibility. The point
of the response is clearly reconciliatory. It is an attempt to show that
Calabresi does not really disagree with the gist of Dworkin's critique.
"It seems to me," he says at one point, "that the differences between
° And at another: "I do not, and
him and me are largely verbal."
1
never have, held that one can trade-off efficiency and justice.""
According to Calabresi's restatement of his position, welfare is no
longer a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal that the law should pursue.
Instead, justice is now crowned as the only such goal. The pursuit of
welfare may only be valuable instrumentally; that is, insofar as it contributes to the attainment of justice.8 2
83
I am not sure that this represents Calabresi's considered view.
It seems to me that he is misled here by the ambiguity of the tradeoffs
issue. Prompted by an impulse to reassert his commitment to Justice
Before Welfare, which implies that tradeoffs in favor of welfare and
against justice are impermissible, he almost relinquishes his commitment to Both Justice and Welfare, which implies that such tradeoffs
are possible. But relinquishing this commitment would amount to a
gratuitous concession, for accepting the possibility of tradeoffs is compatible with rejecting their permissibility.
But, of course, if my critical assessment of Dworkin's critique of
normative law and economics is cogent at all, then Calabresi's concessive comments-whether they merely clarify or also modify the position of Costs-are not just gratuitous. They threaten to trade a rather
plausible thesis for a less plausible one, and for no good reason. I
therefore suggest that we revert to my reading of Calabresi's original
position in Costs, under which he holds Both Justice and Welfare.

80. Calabresi, Letter to Dworkin, supra note 33, at 553 n.1.
81. Id. at 557.
82. Id. at 558-61. For example: "if lawyer-economists do not make the mistake of
claiming too much for what they are doing, and if they are willing to work at defining and
analyzing good instruments leading toward the just society, philosophers ought not be
troubled;" the "mixture of efficiency and distribution" is "instrumental toward justice." Id.
at 561.
83. How do we reconcile Calabresi's claim that he has never "held that one can trade
off efficiency and justice," with his claim that "it is possible to speak of trade-offs between
efficiency-wealth maximization and wealth distribution," for example? Id. at 557, 558.
Surely, since wealth distribution (either the action or the product) is not a goal or value at
all, the expression must refer to justice in the distribution of wealth?
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JUSTICE AS A CONDITION

We have already examined, and rejected, the views that (1) welfare is not a component of value that is a distinct, intrinsically valuable
goal in itself, and (2) the somewhat weaker view that welfare is in fact
such a distinct and genuine goal, but its value depends on justice in
such a way that the two goals cannot conflict. As it turns out, whether
or not Dworkin ever held the first of these two views, he certainly no
longer holds it. However, he apparently still holds on to the second
view. What is more, he has fresh arguments for it. Like the old arguments, they conveniently revolve around a single example. But they
also rely on somewhat more abstract theoretical considerations.
In his Lindley Lecture, Justice and the Good Life, Dworkin explicitly
defines the relationship between justice and welfare ("well-being") by
saying that the former is a condition of the latter.84 Dworkin's critical
target is the "standard assumption of political philosophy ...that redistributive programs impose losses or sacrifices on the part of those
who must pay higher taxes," or the assumption "that measures aimed
at greater justice involve genuine sacrifices for those who lose financially." 5 Now, Dworkin introduces a complication by distinguishing
between a strong version of this claim, in which well-being carries no
weight unless the demands of social justice are satisfied, and a weaker
version, in which the normative contribution of well-being is diminished in an unjust community. And he commits himself only to this
latter, weaker thesis.8 6 I shall largely ignore this complication and
concentrate closely on the strong thesis, deferring my reaction to the
weaker thesis to the end of this Part (VIII.E).
The condition thesis says that welfare carries absolutely no normative significance unless justice is satisfied. Dworkin emphasizes that
this thesis is actually compatible with "the prosperity hypothesis: that
people are better off in a just society in which they have more than in
another one, also just, in which they have less."8 7 All other things being equal (including justice), more welfare is better than less. So welfare must have intrinsic normative significance that is not derived
from the significance ofjustice. Yet the very force of welfare considerations depends on whetherjustice is satisfied. Welfare considerations
cannot favor what justice disfavors.
84. DWORKIN, JUSTICE AND THE GOOD LIFE, supra note 9, at 6.
85. M at 1.
86. Id at 9.
87. Id. at 15. Interestingly, Dworkin seems to extend this claim to wealth! Does he
wish to repudiate his plausible claim that more wealth is not in itself better, not even pro
tanto?
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The condition thesis can be seen as an attempt to save Dworkin's
original critique without committing to the contentious view that welfare is either not a distinct basic value or that it derives all its value
from justice. It is subtly but crucially different from Justice Before
Welfare, under which trading justice for welfare is never permitted.
First, Justice Before Welfare does not imply that justice is ever relevant
to anyone's personal welfare. It simply says that justice always outweighs or takes normative priority over welfare. Second, Justice
Before Welfare does not preclude, but rather presupposes, the possibility of tradeoffs between justice and welfare. Welfare considerations
do not disappear from the normative scene just as they would otherwise conflict with justice considerations; they continue to exert their
normative pressure, only to be defeated in conflict. Under the condition thesis, by contrast, welfare considerations carry no normative
force whatsoever against considerations of justice in the first place. It
is not that justice always defeats welfare in a conflict; it is rather as if
once a conflict between justice and welfare threatens, welfare loses
any normative force it would otherwise have, so there is no longer
anything there for justice to conflict with and defeat.
Dworkin does not quite argue for the condition view. He rather
puts forward a picture he calls "the parameter thesis," which "assumes
that someone's well-being must be judged in terms of how adequately
that person has responded to the challenges and constraints of his
culture and circumstance, and insists that these constraints include
parameters of fairness and justice."8 8 Well-being here is meant as a
"critical" rather than a "volitional" category. One's critical well-being
is improved not by having or achieving what he actually wants or cares
about, but rather "by his having or achieving what he should want, that
is, the achievements or experiences that it would make his life a worse
one not to want."8 9 The parameter thesis says that the demands of
justice constrain what experiences and achievements I should want.
A.

The New OrganizingExample

In Dworkin's new organizing example, someone is asked to pay
taxes that are higher than what he has previously paid and what others
are asked to pay. The progressive tax reform will bring about more
90
social justice in the form of a more equal distribution of resources.
The loss in wealth means that the taxpayer will have to forego all sorts
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id.
90. It is worth pointing out that the focus of the example is the (distributive) justice of
the society, not the justice of the agent. The agent himself may or may not have a say as to
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of goods he wants to have: "comfortable, attractive homes, fast, safe
automobiles, and extended and interesting vacations, for example."'"
Yet the taxpayer in fact wants to see the progressive reform passed,
despite the expected diminution in his personal wealth and the consequential loss of the said goods. The only question is whether the progressive reform involves any genuine loss or sacrifice for the taxpayer,
in terms of how well his life goes.
I should immediately note that Dworkin's choice of example is
odd. Suppose for a moment that Dworkin is entirely right about his
interpretation of the example, and the willing taxpayer who wants to
see the program adopted will in fact suffer no loss to his overall wellbeing as a result of the program. For all we know, this is because his
desire to see the program adopted shows that justice is more important to his personal well-being than whatever goods he would have to
forego. But what about those who do not wish to see the program
adopted? Suppose that I am in the position of the taxpayer in Dworkin's example. To beef up the story, let us assume that, in addition to
the comfortable home, safe automobile, and extended and interesting
vacation that I would have to forego, I would also be forced to forego
a trip abroad to visit my family, to make do with moderately good
rather than excellent health and child care, and to stop my modest
charitable contribution to famine relief in Africa. I understand full
well what social justice requires, namely that I would live in a more
just society if the tax reform were adopted. And I do care about the
good of socialjustice. Still, I care far more about losing all these other
goods than about living in a somewhat more just society.
This, I think, and not the case of the willing taxpayer, is the true
test case for the claim that progressive taxation may involve a genuine
sacrifice in terms of personal well-being. Showing that taxpayers who
are in favor of the socially just program make no genuine sacrifice
would only contradict the claim that higher taxes necessarily impose a
welfare loss on each and every taxpayer-a claim that, as I shall explain in

a moment, is both implausible and ill-described as a standard assumption. Ifjustice is a general condition of well-being, then it is a condition of my well-being whether I support the tax program or not. So if
the condition thesis is right, I am expected to suffer no loss of wellbeing as a result of the program, even though I do not support it in
any way-in fact, even if it infuriates me. But before we consider my
whether the program is adopted. He therefore may or may not be in a position to act in a
more or less just way.
91. DWORKIN, JUSTICE AND THE GOOD LIFE, supra note 9, at 6.
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modified version of Dworkin's example, let us be clear about his critical target.
B.

The Standard Assumption

Dworkin's critical target is the "standard assumption of political
philosophy," or "the assumption at the heart of the modern debate
about justice," that "redistributive programs impose losses or sacrifices
on the part of those who must pay higher taxes," "that measures
aimed at greater justice involve genuine sacrifices for those who lose
financially," and "that people who pay more taxes in the interests of
92 But this is not quite
justice suffer or sacrifice in their own lives."
accurate. There is no standard assumption in political philosophy
that every redistributive tax program imposes genuine losses or sacrifices on every taxpayer. Rather, the standard assumption is that redistributive taxation may well impose such genuine losses or sacrifices and
often enough does so. This is a distinction with a difference: under
the second formulation, the standard assumption is very plausible;
under the first, it is not plausible at all.
It is surely a mistake to think that, just because progressive taxation detracts from my wealth, it must also detract from my well-being.
Thus, for example, so long as I am sufficiently rich and the tax increase is sufficiently small, having to pay more is likely to have no discernible negative effect on my welfare (it may even have a positive
effect). Asking people to pay extra money may or may not amount to
asking them to make a sacrifice in terms of their well-being, depending on, among various other things, how much money they already
have and how much you ask them to pay. By claiming that the progressive tax program requires me to make a genuine sacrifice, I am
not committing myself to the falsity that paying higher taxes must
compromise a taxpayer's welfare, only to the highly intuitive claim
that it may compromise a taxpayer's welfare and does so in my own
case.
C.

The Unwilling Taxpayer

To bring this intuitive claim out, let me beef up our modified
example of the unwilling taxpayer still further. Suppose I am wealthy
enough to be in the top tax bracket and that I am therefore required
to pay the highest tax rate. I am already paying a large percentage of
my salary to the treasury (say, thirty percent), but the redistributive
reform increases this significantly (say, by ten percent). Still, I am
92. Id. at 1, 5.
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right at the bottom of my tax bracket. While wealthier than most people, I am far from being rich. The rich at the top of my tax bracket
would be able to buy the goods that make up their standard of living
anyway. But the tax increase would prevent me from buying various
goods that make up my present standard of living. (An extra trip
abroad per year to visit my parents with the kids, for example.)
Doesn't the diminution in my standard of living constitute a genuine
loss in my overall well-being?
It is hard to see how not. Now it is clear enough that the program
reduces my overall "volitional" well-being: after all, I care less about
justice than about the other goods on the line. But what about my
"critical" well-being? By Dworkin's definition, my critical well-being
is
improved by my "having or achieving what [I] should want, that is, the
achievements or experiences that it would make [my] life a worse one
not to want."9 3 Now this formula does not seem to give any weight at
all to what I actually care about or am disposed to care about. Dworkin's contrast seems to force us to choose between the volitional and
the critical notions of well-being. Yet neither notion is particularly
appealing. The purely volitional account is vulnerable to the familiar
objection that it does not allow for the possibility of uninformed, irrational, or otherwise defective preferences. It does not allow us to criticize our preferences: hence the need for a critical account. But a
purely critical account is vulnerable to an equally familiar and powerful objection. Surely there must be a limit to the preferences or dispositions that we can plausibly discard as irrelevant to how well a
person's life goes? Can we say that something is good for me even
though I would absolutely hate to have it? Can't the fact that I actually care about or am disposed to care about something very much
make a real difference as to whether, or how much, it is good for me?
I am reluctant to believe that Dworkin would wish to deny this much.
In describing his organizing example, he takes care to note that the
agent actually wants to see justice done. In fact, he takes pains to
mention that he has "spent [his] life" pursuing social justice. 9 4 Presumably, he would agree that this fact has at least some bearing on
how well the agent's life goes if the just program is adopted-quite
apart from what the agent should want. If this is right, then the very
fact that I care or am disposed to care more about the foregone goods
than about social justice may have some tendency to show that the
former are more important to my personal well-being than the latter.
93. Id. at 9.
94. Id. at 5.
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To vindicate the language of sacrifice, all we really need is the
claim that the decrease in my standard of living represents
a decrease
in some genuine aspect of my welfare. It is in principle open
to me to
concede that, since I place so much importance on social
justice, my
life on the whole would go better if the tax reform were adopted,
and
still insist that its adoption would involve a genuine and
significant
loss or sacrifice, because the goods that I would have to
forego are
constitutive elements of my well-being. Health care, child
care, family
visits, enjoyable vacations, and modest charitable contributions
to famine relief are all things for which my life is good or valuable.
They are not, however, the only components of my well-being.
In
particular, justice may be another. Under certain circumstances,
compromising some components of well-being for the sake
of securing
others may result in an overall increase in well-being. Like
all genuine
compromises, however, it involves a sacrifice of something
of value.
In this way social justice may involve a genuine sacrifice
on my part
even when it results in an overall increase in my welfare.
E.

The Weak Condition Thesis

I have been attributing to Dworkin a rather simple version
of the
condition thesis, according to which one's well-being cannot
really diminish as long as social justice is done. After all, this would
enable
him to reject the standard assumption about redistributive
taxation. It
would make good sense of his rejection of the view that
social justice
may be a component or aspect of well-being, in favor of
the view that
it is a condition or constraint on well-being.9 5 Still,
when he introduces the notion ofjustice as a condition, he only says
that justice is
a condition of well-being "in some way or to some degree."9 6
But what
is the difference between something being a component
of well-being
and its being a condition of well-being to some extent?
According to Dworkin, 'justice is not any kind of component
of
well-being, but in some way a background condition of
the various
experiences or achievements that are part of well-being having
the full
value that they might."9 7 He distinguishes a strong ("platonic")
version
of this view, "that other components of well-being, like large
homes,
interesting work and travel, are worthless unless the community
in
which these are enjoyed is a fully just one," but settles on
the "more
moderate form of the claim; that the force of these goods,
as contribu95. Id. at 5-9.
96. Id. at 6.
97. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
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so that
tions to an overall good life, is diminished in an unjust community
they do not have the value they would have in just conditions."98
I hope it is clear why I focused my discussion on a stronger verserve
sion of the condition thesis. The weak version is just too weak to
(or less
Dworkin's purpose. The claim that my well-being in an unjust
society is
just) society would be even greater in a just (or more just)
my
equal,
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to
claim
life goes better in a more just society. This is not a trivial
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go even
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better if I could retain my standard of living goods
worse
goes
just society is surely compatible with the claim that my life
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of my
ponent view, injustice may come at a cost to one component
such
other
to
price
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well-being, but justice may come at an even
components.
IX.

JUSTICE BEFORE WELFARE?

Remember that, alongside Both Justice and Welfare, Calabresi
Article
holds Justice Before Welfare. I remarked at the outset of this
theses:
that there is tension between these two admittedly consistent
conIf justice and welfare are independently valuable goals that may
natuonly
is
it
tradeoff,
a
flict, in which case any way we turn involves
ral to assume that tradeoffs in either direction are at least sometimes
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of welfact so. By arguing that the trading off of justice for the sake
that
arguing
be
also
will
I
fare may be morally permissible, of course,
the
Paradoxically,
tradeoffs between justice and welfare are possible.
rearejection of Calabresi's Justice Before Welfare provides a decisive
son to reject Dworkin's critique of tradeoffs.
A.

Interpretation

Considering the view that 'justice is in some sense a goal concur[s] to
rent with accident cost reduction," Calabresi remarks that it "fail
may be
ring true" because it suggests "that a 'rather unjust' system 99
He
worthwhile because it diminishes accident costs effectively."
a
rather
but
goal
a
not
"is
then asserts that, strictly speaking, justice
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 25.
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constraint that can impose a veto on systems or on the use of particular devices or structures within a given system."10 0
Theoretically, the word "can" in this last sentence would seem
to
leave open the possibility that justice does not impose a veto.
To develop the metaphor: perhaps justice has a veto power that it may
or
may not exercise, depending on the circumstances. But Calabresi
tells
us nothing about the circumstances under which this veto
power
should be exercised. For the most part, he simply regards the
veto as
automatic. Thus, fairness is "a final test which any system of accident
law must pass"; 'Justice must ultimately have its due."' ' In sum,
Calabresi seems to hold that the goal ofjustice is an absolute constraint
on
the goal of welfare: that the first goal takes simple lexical priority
over
the second. Of course, we are not only permitted but also required
to
trade off welfare for the sake of justice. But while we could trade
off
justice for welfare if we wanted to, we are never morally permitted
to
do so.
Notice that it is not so easy to understand the significance of the
distinction between Dworkin's (strong) condition thesis and
Calabresi's Justice Before Welfare. For one thing, they seem to carry
the
exact same practical implications. Assuming, as Calabresi and
Dworkin seem to do, that justice and welfare, between them, exhaust
the
normative domain-that no other goal or value is a genuine normative
factor-both appear to hold that considerations of welfare may
only
affect the choice between equally just options. For another, the
difference between the claim that justice wins all its conflicts with welfare
in
virtue of its constraining capacity (Calabresi) and the claim that
justice precludes all such conflicts in virtue of its conditioning capacity
(Dworkin) requires some explanation. Luckily, there is no pressing
need to explain the distinction, because the first thesis is just
as implausible as the second. Indeed, the same considerations that justified
us in rejecting the claim that tradeoffs between justice and welfare
are
impossible will also justify us in rejecting the claim that tradeoffs
in
favor of welfare are never permissible. For welfare may well
defeat
justice.

100. Id.
101. Id at 24 n.1, 26 (emphases added); see also id. at 28 n.6
("[W]e would not tolerate
trade-offs between justice and economic efficiency."). In line
with the rest of his response
to Dworkin, Calabresi declares: "I do not, and never have
held that one can trade off
efficiency and justice." Calabresi, Letter to Dworkin, supra note
33, at 557.
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B.

Derek and Amartya, One Last Time

and
Indeed, I do not think we need much more than the Derek
version of the
Amartya example to prove the point. All we need is the
There we
Modification").
story we discussed in Part VI.B ("Third
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welfare.
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But it strikes me as a small step from this to the suggestion
direction, we are
long as we keep modifying the example in the right
1 is all-thingssure to reach a point where we no longer think Society
Society 2 is
think
we
where
considered better, and then another point
normative turning
all-things-considered better. And we reach these
than Society 2.
points despite the realization that Society 1 is more just
modification of
To bring this out, I would like to introduce one last
assume that, as
stipulation,
the example. Again contrary to Dworkin's
takes $2 from
T (the tyrant) gives Amartya Derek's book, he also
is still a forced
Amartya and gives it to Derek. Ts act is still unjust-it
countertransfer-but it is surely less unjust than its uncompensated
all-things-considis
act
Ts
that
part. At this point, you may still think
expected
ered impermissible. But now keep increasing Amartya's
remembering
wealth gain: $3,000, $30,000, $300,000, $3,000,000 ....
a gain in the
reflect
faithfully
numbers
all the while that these dry
education-inavailability to Amartya of such goods as safety, health,
life goes but
his
well
deed, anything that might seem relevant to how
this credible, of
cannot be plausibly described as justice. To make
valuable good
course, you might have to replace the book with a more
But surely
or set of goods, perhaps a rare medicine or a Stradivarius.
effects,
beneficial
its
or
the book, like the exact nature of the injustice
All we
well.
as
is just a detail. Other possible details would do just
I
And see no
need is one possible case in which justice defeats welfare.
large numbers is
reason to think that my modified scenario with its
with its small
scenario
any less possible than Dworkin's original
numbers.
C.

Calabresi's Fungibility Theme

with, and is less plauJustice Before Welfare also stands in tension
theme, to put
sible than, a recurring theme in Calabresi's work. The
pricelessness
(or
everything
of
it bluntly, is the in-principle fungibility
our society
"that
of nothing). Calabresi rejects as a myth the view
to prewants to avoid accidents at all costs," or that it is "committed
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serving life at any cost. 10 2 These might sound like empirical observa-

tions about what the prevalent moral beliefs in contemporary
society
happen to be, but I prefer to assume that the point goes beyond
such
observations. The point, I think, is not simply that we often
give a
green light to the trading of apparently priceless goods for
the sake of
fungible ones. The interesting point is surely that there
is nothing
necessarily wrong with such tradeoffs either. °3
Now as we have seen, costs for Calabresi are primarily welfare
costs. To say that most every good is fungible in principle is
to say that
some welfare cost may be sufficiently high to justify its sacrifice.
It is to
say that, in the last analysis, it may be morally permissible
to trade the
good in question for some welfare benefit, even if only
for an astronomically large one. But if most everything, including a human
life, is
fungible in principle, it would surely be strange to discover
that the
good of justice is priceless in principle. Consider the right
of the innocent not to be intentionally killed. Violating this right
is unjust if
anything is. If life is fungible in principle, then tragic as
it always is,
the intentional taking of an innocent life to secure (prevent)
a welfare
benefit (loss) may, in the last analysis, be permissible.1 " 4
Admittedly,
the welfare benefit required to render such injustice permissible
is
astronomical. But an astronomical price is a price all the
same.
The in-principle fungibility of everything clearly threatens
to contradictJustice Before Welfare. Perhaps it is possible to come
up with a
doctrine of justice as a non-absolute constraint. But first, merely
pointing out the possibility of such an account does not advance
matters.
Second, and more important, the notion of a non-absolute
constraint
suits me just fine. It implies that at least some tradeoffs between
justice and welfare in favor of the latter are not only possible,
but also
permissible. And this is already more than I need to defend
Both Justice and Welfare and reject Dworkin's critique.

102. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 17-18.
103. This, I take it, is the main point of the interesting
fable about the gift of the "evil
deity" in GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES,
AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAw PROBLEM 1 (1985).
See also Alastair Norcross, Comparing Harms:
Headaches and Human Lives, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 135, 159-67
(1997).
104. Some might resist this claim by saying that certain
acts are always impermissible,
although they may turn out to be justified. In the language
of this Article, this is the claim
that certain acts are always unjust, although they may turn
out to be, all things considered,
permissible. I have no principled objection to interpreting
my claims about permissibility
as claims about justifiability.
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D. Beyond Rights
The foregoing discussion suggests that justice, understood as
rights that constrain welfare enhancement, can only be a non-absolute
constraint. This means that tradeoffs that favor welfare over justice
may be permissible. This result is even more easily seen if we take
not
'justice" to refer to considerations of distributive justice that do
necessarily amount to rights. As it happens, I believe that the University of Michigan has a moral reason to institute an affirmative action
plan in law school admission. This is a reason to divide up a scarce
resource-the limited opportunities to study law at Michigan-among
a
Caucasians and African Americans in a sanctioned way-in short,
a
have
applicants
African-American
reason of distributive justice. Do
sure.
not
am
I
moral right to enjoy priority over Caucasian applicants?
This seems to me to require a further argument. It is plausible to
maintain that some reasons for action fall short of rights.
Such ordinary considerations of distributive justice enjoy absolutely no priority over welfare considerations. Suppose it turns out
that the Michigan affirmative action plan harms Caucasians more
than it helps African Americans. This would be a reason of welfare
against it. It seems that we would have to weigh the reason to mete
out distributive justice or equality against the reason to enhance social
If
welfare. There is no a priori telling which reason should prevail.
or
systems
accident
of
the class of reasons that may bear on the choice
it
rules includes all reasons of distributive justice, and I do not see why
absoshould not, then my argument against the notion ofjustice as an
lute constraint on welfare enhancement is obviated. As such, distributive justice or equality imposes no constraint on welfare enhancement,
or
absolute or not. It enjoys no lexical priority over welfare, simple
qualified.
Notice the interplay between Calabresi's Both Justice and Welfare, on the one hand, and his Justice Before Welfare, on the other.
In the context of accident law, the notion that justice is an absolute
constraint leads to the automatic rejection of alternative accident law
systems and rules simply on account of their relative injustice and irrespective of their relative welfare effects. To avoid this strange result,
Calabresi tends to read his justice goal extremely narrowly. But first,
this effectively empties Justice Before Welfare. Because typically none
of the alternative law reforms on the discussion table include such
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monstrous policies as the beheading of red light runners, none can be
said to be preferable to any on grounds of justice. 10 5
What is more important, such a narrow concept of justice also
renders the best part of Calabresi's position on the goals of accident
law, namely Both Justice and Welfare, unassertable on grounds of
triviality. Indeed, it effectively collapses Calabresi's position on the
normative goals of accident law into applied utilitarianism.1 0 6 But there
is
good news: once he scrapsJustice Before Welfare, the pressure
to give
justice an excessively narrow interpretation disappears. Given
our assessment of this thesis, this is what he should probably do anyway.
This would be a price well worth paying for the warrant to assert
Both
Justice and Welfare.
X.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have sought to provide a partial defense of Both
Justice and Welfare: the claim that both justice and welfare are
independently valuable goals that the law may appropriately pursue-a
view that is attributable to Calabresi. This claim, which might
be
taken to represent an assumption of moderate or minimally pluralist
versions of normative law and economics, implies that the goals
of
justice and welfare may come into conflict and so necessitate
value
tradeoffs and sacrifices. I have tried to repel one line of challenge
to
this view, namely that welfare is either not a distinct, intrinsically
valuable goal at all, or else its value depends on justice in a way that
renders conflicts between the two goals impossible. This, I have claimed,
is a plausible way to read Dworkin's celebrated and foundational
critique of Calabresi, and of normative economic analysis generally.
I have argued that, so interpreted, Dworkin's challenge does not
succeed and that the considerations on which he relies in fact confirm
that welfare is not only a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal, but
is also
independent of justice in a way that makes conflicts between the
two
goals entirely possible.
Dworkin's original critique is based primarily on an example of
forced transfer. I have claimed that the example can only discharge
the claim that tradeoffs between justice and welfare are impossible
if it
can discharge the weaker claim that tradeoffs between justice
and
wealth are impossible. I then claimed that the example cannot possi105. Structurally, this parallels Calabresi's objection to Pareto
efficiency as pointless in
Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessnessof Pareto: CarryingCoase Further,
100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1221
(1991).
106. Cf supra note 11.
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bly do so without begging the question. Moreover, I have claimed
that the example does not even engage the claim that wealth is not a
distinct, intrinsically valuable goal. I have then argued that when we
modify the example to engage this claim, it tends to show that wealth,
or something that may correspond to wealth, is in fact a distinct, intrinsically valuable goal that does not derive its value from justice.
Since welfare fits the description best, this tends to show that welfare is
a distinctly and intrinsically valuable goal.
This does not quite show that welfare is also valuable independently from-and might conflict with-justice. But I have argued that
when we modify the forced-transfer example in the right direction, a
conflictual intuition emerges. To the extent that you share this intuition, you have a reason to accept the tradeoffs view.
Dworkin's second, analogy-based argument for his critique aligns
the distinction between a genuine value conflict and a merely apparent one with his heuristic distinction between a compromise and a
recipe. He claims that the relation between justice and welfare answers to the concept of recipe rather than to that of compromise. I
have argued that the distinction is vitiated by a critical equivocation
and therefore cannot ground an argument. I have then argued that,
even apart from this problem, it is hard to make good sense of the
attempt to analogize the relation between justice and welfare to the
relation between two cake ingredients (or between one ingredient
and the cake as a whole). If anything, the analogy threatens selfdefeat.
I have then considered Dworkin's more recent reflections on the
subject, in which he concedes that welfare or well-being is a distinct,
intrinsically valuable goal, but insists that justice is a condition of wellbeing and challenges the standard assumption that paying higher
taxes in the interest of social distributive justice may well involve a
genuine sacrifice on the part of the taxpayer. I have argued against
the condition thesis and for the standard assumption. Dworkin's discussion fails to explain why we should not accept the more plausible
view that justice may be one component of well-being among several,
and not necessarily the most important one. In the end, Dworkin settles on a version of the condition thesis that is hard to distinguish
from the view that justice may be a component of welfare, which he
rejects. In any event, it is just too weak to challenge the standard
assumption.
Finally, I have attended to Calabresi's Justice Before Welfare, the
view that justice is an absolute constraint on welfare enhancement. I
have argued that this view is unwarranted because some tradeoffs be-
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tween justice and welfare in favor of the latter are, all things considered, morally permissible. What is more, ridding Calabresi of Justice
Before Welfare would resolve a tension with another theme in his writing, namely the in-principle fungibility of everything. Most of all, the
rejection of Calabresi's Justice Before Welfare is perhaps the strongest
case for his Both Justice and Welfare.

